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Abstract
First responders go through rigorous training and evaluation to ensure they are ade-
quately prepared for an emergency. As an example, firefighters continually evaluate
the readiness of their personnel using a defined set of criteria to measure performance
for fire suppression and rescue procedures. From a cyber security standpoint, how-
ever, this same set of criteria and rigor is severely lacking for the professionals that
must detect, respond to and recover from a cyber-based attack against the nation’s
critical infrastructure.
This research provides a framework for evaluating the readiness of cyber first
responders responsible for critical infrastructure protection. The framework demon-
strates the development of evaluation environment, criteria and scenarios that are
modeled from NFPA 1410 standards concept that is used for assessing the readiness
of firefighters. The utility of framework is exhibited during a military cyber training
exercise and demonstrates the ability to evaluate the readiness of cyber first respon-
ders for industrial control systems when responding to the cyber-based attacks in the
scenarios. Although successful, the results and analysis provide a context to develop
a physical processes simulation tool, called Y-Box. The Y-Box creates more acces-
sible, representational, realistic and evaluation-friendly environment to enhance the
framework. The Y-Box demonstrates its application through the simulation of the
first two stages in a wastewater treatment plant. Its performance test demonstrates
its ability to interface with different types of signals from multiple programmable
logic controllers with an acceptable range of error. The utility of simulation is ex-
tended with the development of potential attacks that can be used in a cyber exercise
involving industrial control systems.
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FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
THE READINESS OF
CYBER FIRST RESPONDERS RESPONSIBLE FOR CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In a scene repeated by several motion pictures, burglars conduct a heist to steal
a precious piece of art from a museum by manipulating the security camera with a
recording that shows normal activities. While the guards watch the manipulated view
of the museum, the thieves effortlessly steal the art without being detected.
If the guards detected the manipulated camera view, it would have prevented
the precious art piece from being stolen. Just like the guards have a central role in
protection of their properties as a first line of defense, the cyber first responders for In-
dustrial Control Systems (ICS) have their own to protect against cyber-based attacks.
If this type of attack is unstopped and occurs to the national critical infrastructures,
the damage done can have detrimental impacts on the public’s safety. Evaluation
on the readiness of cyber first responders for ICS is in critical need to minimize or
prevent any damage from the cyber-based attacks. Currently, the evaluation of ICS
cyber professionals is not standardized and primarily conducted through exam-based
certifications, lacking real-time interaction with ICS.
1
1.2 Research Goals and Hypotheses
This thesis presents a framework for evaluating ICS cyber professionals through
the development of scenarios including evaluation criteria and environments that are
enabled by a physical processes simulation tool.
The research goals are:
1. The evaluation from the framework provides valuable feedback to improve the
readiness of cyber first responders for ICS.
2. The simulation tool provides an accessible, representational, realistic and evaluation-
friendly ICS environment, designed to train and assess the cyber first responders
for ICS.
The research hypotheses are:
1. The evaluation concept for first responders can be extended to the evaluation
of the cyber first responders for ICS.
2. The evaluation of cyber first responders for ICS can be conducted in an evalu-
ation environment that simulates physical processes.
3. Physically observable characteristics from simulated physical processes can be
effectively demonstrated through visualization.
4. The simulation tool can interact with types of physical signals typically used in
industrial applications and connect to multiple programmable logic controllers
at once.
This research proceeds with the assumption that high cost and geographical con-
straint to replicate the real physical processes prevents its implementation for evalu-
ation environment.
2
1.3 Thesis Layout
Chapter 1 introduces the motivation and goal of this thesis. Chapter 2 describes
background information that leads to framework development for evaluating the readi-
ness of cyber first responders for ICS and a creation of physical processes simulation
tool for evaluation environments. Chapter 3 explains the methods to evaluate the
framework and the simulation tool. Chapter 4 discusses the results collected in Chap-
ter 3. Chapter 5 summarizes with the conclusions and discusses a significance of this
research. This chapter offers recommendations for future work.
1.4 Special Consideration
The simulation of physical processes for the evaluation environment in Section 3.1
is developed prior to the creation of physical processes simulation tool, to partially
fulfill the requirements for this research. It is used to evaluate the framework and as
a pilot study to see the effectiveness of the custom application model for the physical
processes simulation before the full development of the tool. Described in Section 3.2,
the tool is ultimately created to complement the limitations discovered from the pilot
study. The limitations are described in Section 4.1.2. Chapter 4 provides analysis of
results for the framework and the tool in Section 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
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II. Background and Literature Review
Section 2.1 compares the current evaluation for first responders (e.g., firefighters)
with the one for ICS cyber professionals. Section 2.2 discusses different types of
industrial control systems testbeds and provide a context for the development of a
physical processes simulation tool. Section 2.3 provides an overview of elements that
are minimally required to replicate an evaluation environment.
2.1 Current Evaluation
Evaluation of first responders using realistic scenarios plays a vital role in deter-
mining mission readiness in the areas of public safety. It is hard to imagine a newly
recruited firefighter responding to an emergency situation without the proper assess-
ment of their ability to perform. Moreover, it is inconceivable for a fire station to
respond to a burning building without evaluating their personnel on the standard
tactics required to fight a fire. Indeed, it is critical that firefighters have the ability
to respond appropriately for the given situations they may face, such as the ability
to adequately lay the initial attack line and back-up line, and obtain the appropriate
water pressure within a time limit.
To evaluate the mission readiness of firefighters, fire departments often use the
NFPA 1410 national standards as a common set of criteria [6]. The NFPA 1410
provides a scenario-based standard that has been adopted by the community for
evaluating the readiness of firefighter first responders. The standards use real-world
scenarios and specify objectives, evaluation criteria and metrics for assessing the
readiness of firefighters. The evaluation scenarios identify weaknesses in training and
provide assurance that personnel are ready to respond appropriately.
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Although first responders have used common criteria guidelines for decades to
assess the readiness of their personnel, the notion is in its infancy for cyber pro-
fessionals. Current training evaluation relies primarily on exam-based certifications.
This method of evaluation, however, is not sufficient given the responsibilities asso-
ciated with national critical infrastructure protection.
A cyber-based attack against the nation’s critical infrastructure could have devas-
tating consequences that directly impact public safety. There is a growing awareness
of the threats posed by cyber-based attacks and the implications; however, little is
being done to ensure the competency and preparedness of the cyber professionals that
will be called upon to detect, respond to and recover from an attack.
2.1.1 Assessing Readiness.
It is imperative that first responders are continually evaluated against realistic sce-
narios that may be encountered. Firefighters undergo extensive training and evalua-
tion that mirrors real-world situations to ensure an individual will respond adequately
when called upon. A common set of evaluation criteria helps prepare firefighters for
such responses and helps identify training deficiencies that need attention. Unfortu-
nately, this same set of criteria and rigor is severely lacking for the cyber security
professionals associated with responding to a cyber-based attack against the nations
critical infrastructure.
2.1.1.1 Standard on Training for Emergency Scene Operations.
Fire department personnel engaged in emergency scene operations use the NFPA
1410 evolutions standard for training evaluation [3]. This standard specifies criteria
and metrics that can be adapted to local conditions and serves as a mechanism for
evaluating minimum acceptable performance during training activities.
5
Figure 1 shows a representative evolution training standard for a handline-forward
lead out operation. This example simulates a response to a typical structure fire where
the company must secure a hydrant and lay supply lines towards the building on fire.
The firefighters are evaluated on the ability to correctly apply the forward lay water
supply tactic to obtain the appropriate water pressure to suppress a fire.
The example highlights the various criteria the team is evaluated on and specifies
the maximum time to complete the objective. The NFPA 1410 provides numerous
scenarios and criteria for evaluation that are based on tactics that relate to real-world
scenarios. It is important to note that the guidelines and criteria can be adapted to
meet local and scenario-specific requirements.
2.1.1.2 Cyber First Responders.
Historical events have demonstrated the susceptibility to disruptive cyber-based
attacks against critical infrastructure systems [31]. Attacks against ICS are on the
rise as they target operational capabilities within power plants, factories and refineries
[11]. As an example, ICS-CERT has issued alerts for multiple campaigns (e.g., Havex
RAT [16] and BlackEnergy [18]) aimed at targeting critical systems by exploiting vul-
nerabilities in products from GE, Advantech/Broadwin and Siemens [17]. Similarly,
a recent SANS report claims that a cyber attack was responsible for a power outage
in Ukraine [23]. According to the report, hackers likely compromised control systems
and installed malware to trip breakers to cut power and prevent technicians from
detecting the attack.
Attacks targeting national critical infrastructure can result in devastating conse-
quences. As a first line of defense, organizations spend increasing amounts of money
to train and hire cyber security personnel to prevent, identify and mitigate attacks
[29]. From a maturity standpoint, however, the ability to evaluate the readiness of
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EVOLUTION DESCRIPTION: 
 
A forward lay using one engine and one supply line.  Deploy 300’ of 5” hose from hydrant to fire scene.  Crew shall 
deploy 2 hoselines (1 attack and 1 back-up) capable of flowing a minimum of 300 GPM within 3 minutes from start 
of evolution.  Engine shall be permitted to charge the initial attack line with tank water, hydrant supply shall be 
established before back-up line is in place. 
 
EVALUATION CRITERIA: 
 
• All lines shall be completely deployed from hosebeds. 
• All nozzles shall be flowing minimal acceptable pressures.  Solid tips; 50psi  Combo tips;  100 psi 
• Time begins at signal from training officer until water is flowing at required pressure from both lines and 
supply line has been established. 
 
RECOMMENDED MAXIMUM TIME:  3 MINUTES 
 
Reference:       NFPA 1410, 2000 Edition; Training for Initial Emergency Scene Operations 
                          Department SOG’s 
NOTE;  Instructors / officers should substitute their department standard hose sizes, manpower, and procedures 
for this evolution.  The evolution provided is a guide to help you set up an initial attack evolution.  
Objective  To place a inital attack line (1 3/4) of min. 150’ and a back-up line (2 1/2:) of min. 150’ 
in-service, using units and staffing of the average number of personnel that ordinarily respond.  
Min. 150’ 1 3/4” 
(Attack line) 
Min. 150’ 2 1 /2”  
(Back-up Line) 
300’ 
Supply Line 
Min. 300 
gpm total 
from both 
lines 
NFPA 1410 Evolutions 
Standard on Training for Initial Fire Attack 
NFPA 1—Offensive Single Engine: Handline—Forward Lead Out 
Figure 1. Example NFPA 1410 evolution training standard [6].
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cyber first responders is in its infancy. Training is disparate and the requisite skill
sets have not been standardized [21]. Much attention has been given to frameworks
for system security and organizational risk (e.g., the NIST Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity [20]); however, organizations do not have a stan-
dardized means to evaluate if personnel in a cyber first responder role are adequately
prepared to respond to an incident.
Current evaluation for ICS cyber security skill-sets relies primarily on professional
certifications. The International Society of Automation (ISA), a professional associ-
ation, developed a knowledge-based certificate program designed to test the security
standards described in ISA99 through a multiple choice exam[13]. The ISA99 stan-
dard provides guidelines in areas such as requirements for ICS security management,
security risk assessment and system design, and technical security requirements for
ICS components. Similarly, the Global Information Assurance Certification organi-
zation offers the Global Industrial Cyber Security Professional (GICSP) certification
that tests ICS security professionals on essential ICS security related knowledge ar-
eas [7]. The topics for the test questions include access management, cybersecurity
essentials for ICS, ICS architecture, ICS modules and elements hardening and ICS
security monitoring. The Information Assurance Certification Review Board offers a
Certified SCADA Security Architect (CSSA) certification for individuals that pass a
100 question exam on knowledge relating to securing a Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) system [4].
The primary concerns with the certification programs are a lack of evaluation cri-
teria against a common set of standards and assessing the ability to apply knowledge,
concepts, or experiences to real-time situations associated with an actual exploitation
of ICS [10]. In a study performed by the European Union Agency for Network and
Information Security (ENISA) that examined existing ICS certification programs,
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a key recommendation was the development of a framework for standardizing and
evaluating certified ICS security personnel [21].
In addition to certification programs, United States Government organizations
have implemented various critical infrastructure response efforts to include the Cy-
ber Defense Initiative (CDI) and Cyber Storm. The CDI is sponsored by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and offers training courses to prepare tech-
nical personnel and managers associated with critical infrastructure protection [15].
The training uses lectures, lab exercises and online material to help students prepare
for and respond to a cyber-based terror attack.
Similarly, Cyber Storm is a DHS-sponsored exercise initiated in 2006 that tests and
evaluates the plans, policies and procedures for cyber security response professionals
[19]. Primarily intended to evaluate coordination and information sharing, Cyber
Storm focuses on policies and procedures associated with responding to a cyber-based
attack against the nations critical infrastructure.
Both government-sponsored efforts highlight the need for a standardized evalua-
tion framework for cyber first responders. Indeed, a common evaluation criteria is
needed that can be tailored to an organizations respective environment.
2.2 Evaluation Environment
An evaluation environment including real ICS is necessary to provide real-time
situations that evaluation criteria can be applied within. In most cases, the direct use
of live ICS is not always feasible due to high loss caused by down time and potential
damage for evaluation. Responding to this shortfall, many types of ICS testbeds
were developed as solutions for the cyber security research including functionality
tests between control systems and education for the responders.
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2.2.1 Existing Testbeds.
In order to provide a realistic ICS environment, large-scale testbeds in places like
Idaho National Labs and Sandia National Labs recreate the real-world control sys-
tems, networks and physical processes [14]. Mississippi State’s ICS testbed presents a
real-world control system and real-world physical processes to support its cyber secu-
rity research and education [12]. Others fully or partially simulate their desired ICS
environments with or without the real-world equipment. Reaves et al.’s [5] testbed
fully simulate its ICS environment with virtual devices and simulator to replace the
control systems and physical processes, respectively. Wertzberger [32] et al.’s testbed
simulates physical processes and network while employing real-world control systems.
This research focuses on creating the ICS environment through the simulation of
physical processes. The simulation of physical processes in this research is designed
to satisfy the following attributes:
• Accessible: The physical processes are not geographically limited and cost much
less than the full suite of equipment.
• Expandable: The physical processes may be expanded to reflect a complex ICS
environment.
• Compatible: The physical processes may be connected to the different types of
real-world control systems.
• Separable: The physical processes may be monitored separately from the control
system interface.
The current solutions to the physical processes in their testbeds are summarized
according to attributes in Table 1.
While the physical processes in National SCADA Test Beds (NSTB) and Missis-
sippi State could be ideal, they are constrained by geographic location and are quite
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Table 1. Attributes of physical processes in the testbeds.
Physical processes Accessible Expandable Compatible Separable
NSTB X X X
Mississippi State University X X X
Reaves et al. X X X
Wertzberger et al. X X X
expensive to build. Although the testbeds from Reaves et al. and Wertzberger et al.
can be accessible, expandable and connected to the real-world control systems, they
do not necessarily separate the views from the physically observable characteristics
of physical processes and what are processed by the control systems. The attribute
of separable allows the view of physically observable characteristics, which can be
used to discern the Human Machine Interface (HMI) under normal operation from
maliciously modified or malfunctioning HMI as seen in Figure 2.
If a museum wanted to replicate the movie scene discussed in Section 1.1 as an
exercise to test their defensive capabilities, the exercise coordinators might be tempted
to use the security cameras to monitor the progress of the thieves and to evaluate
the response of the guards. Were the thieves to execute the same camera attack,
the coordinators would be as blind as the guards themselves. Sadly, this is exactly
how cyber exercises are conducted today; the coordinators rely on the same view
of the exercise as the defenders. If attackers manipulate the view of the defenders,
the coordinators are unable to identify what the attackers have done and why the
defenders were unable to detect the changes. A view that can’t be altered by attackers
is necessary for effective control and evaluation by the coordinators.
2.3 Industrial Control Systems and Physical Processes
The evaluation environment is primarily consisted of ICS and physical processes.
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(a) HMI under normal operation.
(b) Maliciously modified or malfunctioning HMI.
Figure 2. Comparison of HMIs to the views of physically observable characteristics of
physical processes.
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2.3.1 Industiral Control Systems.
ICS is a general term used to describe an automation system that manages and
monitors the functionality of an industrial physical processes [9]. The HMI or En-
gineering Station (ES) and Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)s are minimally
required components of ICS for the evaluation environment.
2.3.1.1 HMI and ES.
An HMI or ES displays communications to and from PLCs and other physical
processes in a human-readable interface. This provides ICS operators the ability to
manage and monitor the physical processes [9].
2.3.1.2 Programmable Logic Controllers.
PLCs can be specialized to automate the functions in the physical processes [9].
PLCs for ICS typically include CPU modules, communication modules, power supply
and various types of Input and Output (IO) modules [22]. CPU modules act as the
primary control unit of the PLC and are programmed for each specific application.
Communication modules allow PLCs to communicate with other devices, such as
HMIs, data historians and other PLCs. IO modules allow PLCs to interface with
physical sensors and actuators to control an industrial processes. A sensor is any
device that measures an attribute of a system (e.g., temperature, pressure and flow
rate). An actuator is any device that controls physical aspects of a system (e.g., motor,
valve and heating element). Types of IO modules include analog, digital and specialty
modules. Digital signals are measured as either high or low and can be either Volts
Direct Current (VDC) or Volts Alternating Current (VAC). Typical analog signals
can be measured as either a voltage (0 VDC to 10 VDC) or as a current (4 mA to 20
mA or 0 mA to 20 mA) in an industrial application. Analog Input (AI) modules and
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Digital Input (DI) modules allow a PLC to collect data from various types of sensors.
Analog Output (AO) modules and Digital Output (DO) modules allow a PLC to send
control data to actuators. Specialty modules, such as thermocouple input modules,
are used in ICSs to accomplish application-specific operations. This research focuses
on the interaction with the analog and digital modules of PLCs.
2.3.2 Physical Processes.
Physical processes (e.g., bar screening and grit removal from wastewater) can
be automated with the use of actuators and sensors in industrial facilities. PLCs
command actuators to control the physical processes which is generally based on
process data from sensors.
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III. Methodology
Section 3.1 describes the experimental design of evaluation criteria, environment
and scenarios for the framework, to be evaluated in a cyber training exercise. Section
3.2 describes the functionality of physical processes simulation tool referred as Y-Box
hereafter. It further describes the Y-Box’s experiment set-up for a performance test
and applications.
3.1 Development and Evaluation of Framework
To help develop the framework for evaluating the readiness of cyber first respon-
ders, a study is conducted using the NFPA 1410 concept applied to ICS cyber security
personnel. The study evaluates the readiness of cyber security personnel to respond
to targeted cyber attacks during a military cyber training exercise that occurred over
a one week period. Although various scenarios are incorporated throughout the train-
ing exercise, the evaluation for cyber first responders focuses on developing scenarios,
defining criteria and specifying metrics for evaluation using the NFPA 1410 concept.
At the conclusion of the military cyber training exercise, the study is evaluated to
validate the utility of framework.
The training exercise consisted of: (i) a team of military cyber professionals re-
sponsible for ICS security; (ii) a red team that applies adversary tactics to exploit
ICS and create effects; and (iii) an evaluation team that measures the effectiveness of
the cyber professionals at identifying, responding and mitigating the attacks initiated
by the red team. The training environment consisted of a Siemens Apogee Heating,
Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system that is configured for standard op-
erations. An evaluator monitoring capability is implemented for the Apogee system
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to enable the evaluation team to discern physical effects created by the red team and
observe response actions of the cyber professionals.
3.1.1 Evaluation Criteria.
The training objectives, tactics and criteria are specified using the NFPA 1410
concept. The following example details an evaluation scenario for ICS cyber security
tasks.
Denial-of-service attack targeting the human machine interface (HMI)
• Objective: Identify a denial-of-service attack and minimize effects on physical
system operations.
• Description: Denial-of-service attack is launched from external IP that exhausts
resources on the HMI computer.
• Type: Loss of control and loss of awareness.
• Evaluation Criteria:
– Detect within three minutes.
– Report within six minutes.
– Prevent physical process down time.
• Reference: Operational response plans and security response plans.
In this example, the cyber security professionals should detect a denial-of-service
attack targeting the HMI within three minutes and report the attack through appro-
priate channels within six minutes. Additionally, the physical process should not be
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disrupted. The attack creates a loss of control and awareness for the operator. Op-
erational response plans and security response plans are used to derive the expected
actions and requirements for the cyber first responders.
3.1.2 Evaluation Environment.
There are certain limitations in creating an operational environment for assess-
ment of ICS cyber security tasks. The use of real-world systems is not always feasible
due to potential damage and down-time for evaluation. Additionally, developing a
real-world system for evaluation purposes (e.g., water treatment facility, HVAC of a
building and gas pipeline flow control system), can be prohibitively expensive and
time consuming. The ability to incorporate ICS components coupled with simulated
attributes, however, has proven useful for training environments [8].
The cyber training exercise and evaluation incorporates the Siemens Apogee HVAC
system that includes an air conditioner, heater, and fan. To simulate the physical
processes and enable the evaluation team to observe physical effects, the input/out-
put settings for temperature and flow are simulated using a process control model
implemented in software. Figure 3 shows the Apogee system and components used
in the cyber training exercise.
PXCM1 is a programmable controller-modular (PXCM) that provides digital and
analog control of building sensors and actuators. PXCM1 receives sensor measure-
ments through the analog module and initiates control actions according to pro-
grammed logic through the digital module. For example, if a sensor is reporting a
temperature of 73◦ F and the air conditioner setpoint is configured for 70◦ F, PXCM1
will initiate a control signal to turn on the air conditioner. The status of the sys-
tem is relayed through an operator control panel that provides indicator lights and
readings for current conditions and provides the ability to override or modify settings
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Figure 3. Apogee HVAC system schematics.
[30]. The Arduino UNO is a customizable microcontroller that provides 6 analog
inputs, 14 digital inputs/outputs and 6 PWM outputs. The Arduino microcontroller
is incorporated into the training exercise configuration to emulate the actuators and
sensors that control the physical environment conditions.
For the physical environment, a custom application in the simulation terminal
is used to emulate operating conditions. The application characterizes heating and
cooling parameters that alter the environmental settings. As shown in Figure 4,
the simulation terminal provides inputs to the Arduino microcontroller based on the
application output that represents environmental conditions (e.g., air temperature).
The microcontroller translates the settings into analog and digital voltage and sends
the corresponding signals to PXCM1. PXCM1 receives the signals and initiates the
appropriate control and notification actions. Similarly, when an operator initiates a
control action, the PXCM1 sends the control message to the Arduino UNO which, in
turn, updates the environmental variables. For example, if an operator initiates an
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action to turn on the cooling fan, the PXCM1 sends a digital control signal that is
received by the Arduino. The Arduino sends an update message to the simulation
terminal to turn on the cooling fan. The simulation incorporates the change, and the
environment temperature will start to decrease accordingly.
The initial environment settings specified in the custom application include set-
point, minimum temperature and maximum temperature. The real-time status of the
heating and air conditioning is represented via a graphical interface shown in Figure
5. Note that this representation indicates the true physical state of the system and
is considered “ground truth” for environmental conditions.
The Apogee system incorporates FTP (Port 21) and Telnet (Port 23) services as
well as the Siemens P2 application (Port 5033) for management services. Using these
protocols, the HMI provides the graphical interface for the operators. As represented
in Figure 6, the display shows the current status of the system and enables the ability
to control the environment. Under normal operating conditions, the HMI should
reflect the actual physical environment conditions (i.e., the HMI should be consistent
with the custom application interface). An attacker that targets the integrity of the
system could exploit the Apogee system and change the operating parameters, while
masking the changes in the environment from the operator on the HMI.
3.1.3 Scenarios.
The scenarios are developed to evaluate specific objectives for cyber security pro-
fessionals. Note that for the purposes of this paper, the focus is on defining a frame-
work for evaluating cyber first responders, and not the performance of the cyber
security professionals during this specific training exercise. As such, the focus of
analysis is on the ability to use the NFPA 1410 concept for evaluating cyber first
responders in an actual training exercise scenario.
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Figure 4. Functional diagram of the exercise system environment.
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Figure 5. Representation of the real-time status of environmental conditions.
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Figure 6. The operator HMI for monitoring and controlling environmental conditions.
The scenarios are derived using operational requirements and expected actions
of the cyber security professionals. Five scenarios are presented that are evaluated
during the training exercise using the NFPA 1410 concept.
Gain Remote Access and Exfiltrate Data
• Objective: Identify remote system compromise and detect exfiltration of critical
system data.
• Description: The attacker performs a dictionary attack on the PXCM1 FTP
username/password and uses the credentials to login via Telnet. The Telnet
service for Apogee allows the attacker to change configurations or values to
control the HVAC and provides the attacker remote access. The attacker also
uses the FTP server to exfiltrate Apogee configuration data.
• Type: Loss of confidentiality.
21
• Evaluation Criteria:
– Detect within three minutes.
– Report within six minutes.
– Determine how system was compromised and identify all compromised
components.
– Remove compromised access.
– Reconfigure to prevent further compromise.
– Prevent physical process down time.
• Reference: Standard operating procedures, response action plans and cyber de-
fensive tactics, techniques and procedures manual.
System Denial-of-Service Attack
• Objective: Identify denial-of-service attack and restore system control.
• Description: The attacker uses a SYN flood to exhaust the resources of PXCM1.
The attack prevents the operator from controlling system processes.
• Type: Loss of control.
• Evaluation Criteria:
– Detect within three minutes.
– Report within six minutes.
– Recover physical process control within five minutes.
– Determine how system was compromised and identify all compromised
components.
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– Remove compromised access.
– Reconfigure to prevent further compromise.
• Reference: Standard operating procedures, response action plans and cyber de-
fensive tactics, techniques and procedures manual.
System Crash
• Objective: Identify system compromise and restore system control and moni-
toring.
• Description: The attacker exploits a known vulnerability for the Apogee HMI
OS running Windows Vista SP1. A metasploit module allows the attacker to
exploit and crash the Apogee server.
• Type: Loss of control and loss of awareness.
• Evaluation Criteria:
– Detect within three minutes.
– Report within six minutes.
– Recover physical process control within five minutes.
– Determine how system was compromised and identify all compromised
components.
– Remove compromised access.
– Reconfigure to prevent further compromise.
• Reference: Standard operating procedures, response action plans and cyber de-
fensive tactics, techniques and procedures manual.
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Repeated Reboot
• Objective: Identify system compromise, eradicate malware and restore system
control and monitoring.
• Description: The attacker installs a script on the network that sends a repeated
reboot command to PXCM1 through the Siemens P2 protocol. PXCM1 receives
the command and authorizes a reboot of the system. After the system reboots,
another command initiates a reboot to repeat the process.
• Type: Loss of control and loss of awareness.
• Evaluation Criteria:
– Detect within three minutes.
– Report within six minutes.
– Identify the malicious script installed that is forcing the reboot.
– Remove the script without effecting configuration of the physical process.
– Determine how system was compromised and identify all compromised
components.
– Remove compromised access.
– Reconfigure to prevent further compromise.
• Reference: Standard operating procedures, response action plans and cyber de-
fensive tactics, techniques and procedures manual.
Covert Manipulation of Control
• Objective: Identify system compromise, eradicate malware and restore system
operation parameters.
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• Description: The attacker gains access to the Apogee system and modifies the
control code on PXCM1. The attacker increases the actual physical tempera-
ture, while providing a normal display on the HMI.
• Type: Loss of integrity.
• Evaluation Criteria:
– Detect within six minutes.
– Report within nine minutes.
– Identify the malicious script that is manipulating the temperature and
masking the impacts.
– Remove the script without effecting configuration of the physical process.
– Determine how system was compromised and all compromised compo-
nents.
– Remove compromised access.
– Reconfigure to prevent further compromise.
• Reference: Standard operating procedures, response action plans and cyber de-
fensive tactics, techniques and procedures manual.
3.1.3.1 Attack Details.
This section details the various attack scenarios and key indicators for the cyber
defense team.
• Gain Remote Access and Exfiltrate Data: The red team initiates an exploit
to obtain the admin username and password to extract sensitive data stored in
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PXCM1 using the FTP service. The default usernames for Apogee accounts are
classified as high, medium and low for different privileges based on roles. The
high classification includes admin privileges, and the username and passwords
are not case sensitive. Additionally, the login credentials are the same for the
FTP and Telnet services. The red team executes a dictionary attack to obtain
the credentials and gain remote system access through the Telnet service. Once
system access is obtained, the red team accesses the PXCM1 configuration files
and extracts the data using the FTP service. Key indicators for the cyber pro-
fessional team include failed login attempts, unauthorized access and increased
network activities.
• System Denial-of-Service Attack: Using adjacent network access, the red team
initiates a denial-of-service attack using a SYN flood to exhaust the Apogee
system resources. The red team gains access to a vulnerable system on the same
network segment, and then sends a large number of SYN packets to PXCM1.
The attack results in a loss of control for the operator by preventing the ability
to send control commands for the HVAC system. Key indicators for the cyber
professional team include increased network traffic, unauthorized access and
loss of system control.
• System Crash: The red team utilizes a known vulnerability for the Apogee
server operating system (Windows Vista SP 1) to force a system crash. Using
adjacent network access, the red team initiates an attack that causes the Apogee
server to crash, as shown in Figure 7. The attack results in a loss of control
for the operator until the system is manually rebooted. Key indicators for the
cyber professional team include unauthorized commands, unauthorized access
and system failure.
26
Figure 7. Bluescreen effect created by system attack.
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• Repeated Reboot Attack: The red team initiates an attack to force PXCM1 to
continually reboot. Using services offers via the Siemens P2 protocol, the red
team uses a malicious script to send repeated reboot commands to PXCM1.
The attack results in loss of control for the operator and the inability to mon-
itor environmental conditions. Key indicators for the cyber professional team
include unauthorized commands and system failure.
• Covert Manipulation of Control: The red team gains remote access to the
Apogee server and manipulates the control code of PXCM1. In this attack, the
red team overrides the temperature reading with a manipulated value. As seen
in Figure 8, the operator sees normal operating conditions, whereas the attack
has caused the actual environment to increase in temperature. Key indicators
for the cyber professional team include unauthorized commands, unauthorized
access and compromised system integrity.
3.2 Functionality and Evaluation of Y-Box
Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 explains the Y-Box system architecture and hardware
design to describe its functionality. Performance test and applications of the Y-Box
are described in Section 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.
3.2.1 System Architecture.
For the development of the first version of Y-Box, a preliminary site survey is
conducted in a Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP). The types of Y-Box input
and output modules in the first version are similar to the types seen in the PLCs in
the surveyed wastewater treatment plant.
A key design consideration is that the Y-Box exchanges physical signals only,
such as voltage or current, with PLCs to not interfere with any cyber activities in the
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Figure 8. Attack results that manipulate environmental settings and mask implications
from the operator.
connected control systems. For the physical processes simulation, the Y-Box interacts
directly with a PLC’s IO modules to facilitate the real-time and accurate exchanges
of physical signals, replacing PLCs interaction with the real actuators and sensors.
A simulation terminal collects actuator data from PLCs, simulates the response of
a physical system, and then generates sensor values to send back to the PLCs. To
interact with a PLC, the Y-Box inputs are connected to the PLC outputs, and the
Y-Box outputs are connected to the PLC inputs. This process is shown in Figure 9.
Similar to a PLC, the Y-Box consists of a CPU module, an optional communication
module, and various IO modules. The proposed Y-Box architecture is shown in Figure
10. The Y-Box is intended to be flexible. The Y-Box modules are designed to allow
connection to a variety of PLCs, sensors and actuators.
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Figure 9. Simulation process.
3.2.1.1 Analog Input Modules.
AI modules read analog signals generated by a PLC intended to control actuators
(e.g., pump and control valve). AI modules on the Y-Box support up to eight inputs
simultaneously and can measure voltage and current. The analog data is then re-
trieved by the CPU module for use in simulation. The AI module supports physical
actuators to connect to the voltage or current signals without negatively impacting
the accuracy of the signals. This allows the PLC to control a real actuator, while still
allowing the Y-Box to monitor the actuator control data. Through this capability,
the Y-Box can monitor an actuator and override the control data to simulate events
such as an actuator failure. AI modules can also be connected to real sensors that can
monitor a physical process. This flexibility allows the Y-Box to be used in a variety
of applications.
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Figure 10. System architecture overview.
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3.2.1.2 Digital Input Modules.
DI modules read digital signals generated by a PLC intended to control discrete
components in a system (e.g., light bulbs). DI modules support up to seven inputs
simultaneously and can be used with 24 VDC signals, which are typically used as
high signals for digital modules. The measured data are then retrieved by the CPU
module for simulation. Similar to the AI modules, DI modules can be connected in a
variety of configurations to ensure flexibility.
3.2.1.3 Analog Output Modules.
AO modules generate analog signals that simulate sensor outputs that are mea-
sured by a PLC. AO modules support up to eight outputs and can be configured to
generate either voltage or current. The PLC uses this computed sensor data from the
simulation to determine the desired actuator control data for the system.
3.2.1.4 Digital Output Modules.
DO modules generate voltage levels that simulate discrete sensors (e.g., level
switches) measured by a PLC. Similar to the DI modules, DO modules support up
to seven channels and can be used with 24 VDC.
3.2.1.5 CPU Module.
The CPU module is responsible for collecting data from Y-Box input modules and
sending data to Y-Box output modules. The CPU module can be connected via USB
to a simulation terminal or a communication module. Depending on the connectivity
requirements, the CPU module can act as a simple data pass-through, or it can run a
simulation program directly. This allows the CPU module to run a simulation while
isolated from any simulation terminals. Note that, if the CPU module acts as a pass-
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through, a simulation terminal must be connected to the CPU module to execute the
simulation.
3.2.1.6 Communication Module.
The communication module provides a remote connection between the simulation
terminal and the CPU module. A Raspberry Pi is capable of serving as a communi-
cation module for the Y-Box as it has built-in USB and Ethernet ports. This type
of configuration is shown in Figure 11. The communication module allows the con-
nection of multiple CPU modules in Y-Boxes with a single simulation terminal via
Ethernet connection.
3.2.1.7 Simulation Terminal.
The simulation terminal receives actuator control data from the CPU module and
uses this data in a simulation program to compute the process values (e.g., water
level and flow rate) of the simulated physical system. The process values are used to
calculate analog and digital sensor values, which are sent to the Y-Box CPU module
for output to a PLC. The simulation program can be written in any language capable
of serial or network communication. The simulation terminal connects to the Y-Box
CPU module via USB, using an ASCII protocol. The received analog values range
Figure 11. Communication module connection.
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from 0 and 4095 (12-bits), and digital values may be 0 or 1 to indicate low or high
status, respectively.
3.2.2 Hardware Design.
This section discusses the hardware design of the individual Y-Box modules. Each
IO module has one ATTiny44A microcontroller to handle communication with the
CPU module as shown in Figure 12. Main parts for the modules are listed in Table
2.
3.2.2.1 Analog Input Module.
The AI module supports up to eight inputs. A series of DIP switches are used to
individually configure each input for voltage or current. In voltage mode, the input
signal is measured directly. In current mode, a precision 250 Ω shunt resistor is used
to convert a 0 mA to 20 mA signal to a 0 VDC to 5 VDC signal. For each input, an
operation amplifier (opamp) is used to buffer the signal and limit any current leakage.
This buffer allows the current from the input to be unaffected should another device
need to measure the same signal. In voltage mode, another opamp is used as a voltage
divider to reduce the 0 VDC to 10 VDC signal down to 0 VDC to 5 VDC. In current
Table 2. Main Parts
Part Name Module Description Manufacturer
MCP3208 AI 8 ch. 12-bit ADC Microchip
MCP4902 AO 2 ch. 12-bit DAC Microchip
ATTiny44A All IO Microcontroller Atmel
Arduino Micro CPU Microcontroller (ATmega32U4) Board Atmel
LM324 AI, AO, DI Operational Amplifier TI
74HC138 CPU Demultiplexer NXP
XTR111 AO Voltage to Current Converter TI
KA7805 All IO 5V Voltage Regulator Fairchild
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(a) AI module. (b) DI module.
(c) AO module. (d) DO module.
Figure 12. IO modules communication flow.
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mode, this opamp simply acts as another buffer for the 0 VDC to 5 VDC signal.
The divided signal is then sent to an Analog to Digital Converter (ADC) with 12-
bit resolution. The ADC converts the 0 VDC to 5 VDC signal into an integer value
which is then read by the microcontroller via a serial connection. The microcontroller
continuously reads the channel values from the ADC via serial peripheral interface
and prepares them for transmission to the CPU module.
3.2.2.2 Digital Input Module.
The DI module supports up to seven inputs. For each input, one opamp is used
as a voltage divider to reduce the 0 VDC to 24 VDC signal to 0 VDC to 5 VDC.
The reduced signal is then read using a General Purpose IO (GPIO) pin of the
microcontroller.
3.2.2.3 Analog Output Module.
The AO module supports up to eight outputs simultaneously. A 12-bit Digital to
Analog Converter (DAC) is used to generate a 0 VDC to 5 VDC signal. An opamp
is used as a voltage amplifier to raise the voltage to 0 VDC to 10 VDC. This voltage
may then be read directly by a PLC analog input. Alternatively, the 0 VDC to 10
VDC signal may be fed into an optional voltage to current converter which converts
the signal to current that ranges from 0 mA to 20 mA.
3.2.2.4 Digital Output Module.
The DO module supports up to seven outputs simultaneously. The microcon-
troller’s GPIO pins are used to output a 0 VDC or 5 VDC signal. The 5 VDC signals
control NPN and PMOS transistors to output either 0 VDC or 24 VDC.
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3.2.2.5 CPU Module.
The CPU module communicates with the IO modules using a Serial Peripheral
Interface. The Arduino Micro microcontroller in the CPU module acts as a bus master
and connects to the microcontroller in each IO module. The CPU module contains
a demultiplexer which is used to select a single IO module for communication. The
Arduino Micro’s digital pins are used to control the demultiplexer and select the IO
module to send information. Each IO module has an input that is used to select
that module. The current CPU module supports up to eight connected IO modules
simultaneously. The number of modules can be expanded in future versions by simply
adding another demultiplexer.
The protocol used to communicate with the IO modules is shown in Table 3. To
identify the slot number and type of each attached IO module, the CPU module sends
the heartbeat command to each slot. In return, it receives a unique ID for the IO
module connected to the selected slot. The heartbeat command is also periodically
used to verify the connection with each IO module during operation.
3.2.3 Experiment Design.
The goal of Y-Box is to simulate physical processes by interfacing with PLCs
via various types of signals. To accomplish this goal, the Y-Box needs to accurately
measure signals generated by a PLC, and it needs to be capable of generating signals
that a PLC can measure. To simulate realistic systems, the Y-Box needs to be
capable of scaling to interface with multiple PLCs at one time. This evaluation
focuses primarily on the accuracy of the Y-Box IO modules.
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Table 3. Communication protocol.
Command
Byte 1 Byte 2
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Heartbeat 1 X X X X X X X N/A
Read AI 0 X X X Channel N/A
Read DI 0 0 X X Channel N/A
Read DI All 0 1 X X X X X X N/A
Write AO 0 Channel D
Write DO 0 0 X Channel D N/A
Write DO All 0 1 D X X X X X X
X - Don’t Care
D - Data
1 - High
0 - Low
3.2.3.1 Approach.
To evaluate the Y-Box AI module, an analog signal is generated by the PLC and
measured by the Y-Box. Similarly, to evaluate the Y-Box AO module, an analog
signal is generated by the Y-Box and measured by the PLC. The measured values are
then compared to the expected values to calculate the percent error. It is important
to note that the measured value is actually the error caused by the PLC in addition to
the error caused by the Y-Box. These two error sources cannot be readily separated
in this experiment.
3.2.3.2 Performance Metric.
The selected metric for the performance test is based on percent error over range
of the Y-Box IO modules as shown in Equation 1. The analog values for the Y-Box
modules range from 0 to 4095 (12-bit resolution). The digital values for the Y-Box
range from 0 to 1 to indicate low or high.
38
Percent Error Over Range (%) =
Abs. (Sent V alue−Received V alue)
Max. V alue−Min. V alue
×100 (1)
A similar metric is used by industrial PLC manufacturers such as Rockewell Au-
tomation to measure the precision of their equipment [27]. Two types of PLCs,
CompactLogix and ControlLogix from Rockwell Automation, are selected to deter-
mine the acceptable range of error. CompactLogix has the accuracy of ±0.7% and
±0.6% over the range for AI voltage and current modes, respectively, where its AO
has ±0.5% for both modes at room temperature [25]. ControLogix presents module
error from ±0.1% to ±0.6% depending on the various modules [26]. Considering the
measurements reflecting the errors from both the Y-Box and PLCs, it is considered
to be acceptable for the Y-Box to have the percent error over range similar to that
of CompactLogix.
3.2.3.3 Parameters.
The parameters listed here could potentially impact the performance of the Y-Box,
but are not specifically evaluated in this research.
• Number of IO modules: Although it is not expected to impact the accuracy of
Y-Box, the number of Y-Box IO modules connected at one time may potentially
impact performance. For this evaluation, one of each type of IO module (AI,
AO, DI and DO) is connected to a single Y-Box CPU module.
• Selected IO channels: The selected channel number for the Y-Box and PLC
impacts the accuracy if the various channels perform differently. This could
be caused by minor hardware differences between the channels. Although not
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specifically addressed in this research, the channel numbers for the experiments
are randomized to account for these potential errors.
• Setup and hold time refer to the amount of time from when a signal is generated
to when it is measured. Pilot studies show that 400 ms is a sufficient delay to
allow all signals to reach steady state. This delay is used for all measurements
of the system.
3.2.3.4 Calibration.
All analog signals have some level of error created by flaws in the various hardware
components. PLCs often use a calibration process to account for these errors and
correct the component inaccuracies [27]. Calibration of the Y-Box is conducted during
the experiments to account for the margin of error in the hardware components.
The calibration values for each channel in the analog IO modules are measured and
recorded. A precision voltage source and precision voltage meter are used to measure
the calibration values. The raw measurements from each experiment are recorded,
and the calibration is applied as a post-processing step using Equations 3 and 2. The
calibration impact is discussed in Section 4.2.1.
Calibrated Data from
AI Module
=
Received V alue by Y –Box (0 to 4095)
Calibration V alue (V or I)
× 4095 (2)
Calibrated Data from
AO Module
=
Received V alue by PLC (0 to 4095)
Calibration V alue (V or I)
× 10 V or 20 mA
(3)
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3.2.3.5 PLCs.
This evaluation utilizes two Allen Bradley PLCs to measure the performance of the
Y-Box. The first PLC is a ControlLogix PLC with the following modules: 1756-L61,
1756-ENBT, 1756-OF4, 1756-OB8, 1756-IF16 and 1756-IB16. These modules provide
the ControlLogix with one of each type of IO (AI, AO, DI, DO). The second PLC is a
CompactLogix 1769-L23E-QBFC1. This CompactLogix PLC also has each type of IO.
The ControlLogix used for evaluation offers 16-bit for AI current and voltage modes,
16-bit for AO voltage mode and 15-bit for AO current mode [27]. CompactLogix
offers 8-bit for all data types [24]. These two PLCs are used to evaluate the accuracy
of Y-Box IO modules; future work will evaluate the Y-Box with more types of PLCs.
Two configurations are used to evaluate the performance of the Y-Box with the
PLCs. The Y-Box is first evaluated with just the ControlLogix PLC connected and
then again with both PLCs connected. The accuracy achieved with one PLC con-
nected is compared to the performance with two PLCs connected. This determines if
having two PLCs connected at one time impacts the performance. Also, the perfor-
mance of the Y-Box with the ControlLogix is compared to the performance with the
CompactLogix. This helps show the difference in performance between PLCs with
varying resolution.
For each configuration, the input and output channels are randomly selected for
both the PLCs and Y-Box. It is important to note that the selected ControlLogix
channels are randomly changed for the second configuration.
3.2.3.6 Analog Values.
The amplitude of the analog signals is expected to impact the accuracy of the
measurements. To evaluate this impact, five analog values are used: 0, 1024, 2048,
3072 and 4095. In current mode, these values represent 0 mA, 5 mA, 10 mA, 15 mA
41
and 20 mA, respectively. In voltage mode, these values represent 0 V, 2.5 V, 5 V, 7.5
V and 10 V, respectively. This provides a range of values to determine the accuracy
of the Y-Box.
3.2.3.7 Digital Values.
All digital values are measured as high or low.
3.2.3.8 Experiment Set-up.
The experiment set-up for evaluation is shown in Figure 13. The data collector
residing in the simulation terminal interacts with CPU modules of PLCs and the
Y-Box to send and receive the necessary signals for the experiments. IO modules
in PLCs and Y-Box are interconnected to send and receive the signals processed by
the CPU modules. Below is the process used to collect data from PLC or Y-Box in
sequential steps. For analog modules, 50 measurements per channel per value for 5
different values (e.g., 0, 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4095) are collected to provide sufficient
data for analysis. For digital modules, 50 measurements per channel per value for 2
different values (e.g., high and low) are collected to provide sufficient data for analysis.
1. Determine parameters for the next measurement.
2. Write an analog or digital values to either the PLC or Y-Box.
3. Wait 400 milliseconds.
4. Read measured value from either the PLC or Y-Box.
5. Record measurement and expected value.
6. Wait 100 milliseconds.
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Figure 13. Experiment set-up.
3.2.4 Applications.
This section describes how the Y-Box simulates the physical processes controlled
by PLCs in two scenarios. The Y-Box physically connects to the PLCs (ControlLogix
and CompactLogix), an exploded view is offered in Figure 14. The implementation
for the scenarios follows the simulation process shown in Figure 9.
3.2.4.1 Implementation of the First Scenario.
The first scenario simulates the bar screen stage in a WWTP. Bar screens are
typically the first step of processing wastewater in a WWTP to mechanically filter
out large objects (e.g., bulky solids, rags and plastics) [1]. Bar screens help reduce
clogging and damage of valves and pumps. The first seven steps in Figure 15 illustrate
the sequential steps of the bar screen stage. The boxes with sharp corners are part of
the PLC process, while the boxes with soft corners are for the Y-Box. It also shows
the dependencies represented in the directional arrows. The arrows illustrate the flow
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Figure 14. Physical setup for scenarios.
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of required data to compute process data for the sensor values and to determine the
actuator control data.
• Initial States: Initial states of wet well, stage 1, stage 2 and clog level are
required to give the starting points of the intended simulation. Wet well acts
as a reservoir of wastewater waiting to enter the bar screens stage. Stage 1 is
the water level in a bar screen stage before the filtering process (stage 2). The
initial states seen in Figure 16a are defined once at the start of simulation.
• Influent Rate: Influent rate is the user defined value that can be adjusted
throughout the simulation as seen in Figure 16a. Influent rate determines the
amount of wastewater entering from wet well to stage 1 in the bar screen stage.
An analog output of the Y-Box is used to send it to the PLC (Figure 15).
• Wet Well Level: Wet well level depends on the influent and pump rate. Wet well
level goes up by the amount of influent and down by the amount being pumped
out. It has two digital sensors to indicate low and high levels of wastewater.
Two digital outputs of the Y-Box are used to send the levels of wet well to PLC
1 (Figure 15).
• Pump: Pump rate is determined within PLC 1 based on the influent rate and
the water levels in the wet well and stage 1. For example, pump rate matches
influent rate when wet well level is high and stage 1 level is low. On the other
hand, pump stops regardless of influent rate when wet well level is low and stage
1 level high. An analog output of PLC 1 is used to send the pump rate data to
the Y-Box (Figure 15).
• Stage 1 Level: Stage 1 level is determined by the Y-Box based on the pump rate
and clog level of the bar screen. The clog level indicates the amount of material
built up in the bar screen. The clog level goes up when the bar screen collects
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Figure 15. Scenario 1 and 2 sequential steps with dependencies.
more objects depending on the filth rate of wastewater or down when the bar
screen is cleaned. The bar screen is cleaned according to the clog clean rate
when the bar screen belt is on. The clog clean rate and filth rate are defined
as seen in Figure 16a and can be adjusted throughout the simulation. The clog
in the bar screen blocks, with varying degree, the water transfer from stage 1
resulting in the rise of water level. High pump rate and clog level would make
stage 1 level rise faster. Stage 1 has three digital sensors to indicate the water
levels (Low, High, High High). Three digital outputs of the Y-Box are used to
send the levels of stage 1 to PLC 1 (Figure 15).
• Bar Screen Belt: Bar screen belt operation includes two modes (i.e., automatic
and running). The automatic mode turns the bar screen belt on and off peri-
odically. The running mode keeps the bar screen belt running when the level
difference between stage 1 and 2 exceeds a set point defined in PLC 1. Y-Box
sends the stage 1 and 2 level difference to PLC 1 via an analog output. Once
the mode is determined, a digital output of PLC 1 is used to send it to the
Y-Box (Figure 15).
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• Stage 2 and Effluent rate: Stage 2 releases the transferred water from stage 1
when it exceeds the amount stage 2 can hold. The amount of water that stage
2 can hold is defined before the simulation. Effluent rate is determined by the
amount of water stage 2 releases. An analog output of the Y-Box is used to
send it to PLC 2 (Figure 15). PLC 2 measures the amount of flow into the grit
tank from the effluent rate.
3.2.4.2 Implementation of the Second Scenario.
The second scenario is the extension of first scenario. It adds one more stage, grit
tank, to the first scenario with the addition of a PLC (Allen Bradley, CompactLogix
L23E) (Figure 15). The grit tank purpose is to remove smaller objects (e.g., sand,
broken glass, silt and pebbles) that may damage pumps and other mechanical devices
[2]. The last two steps in Figure 15 illustrate the sequential steps of grit tank stage.
• Grit Tank Pump Switch: The grit tank pump switch in the Y-Box acts as a
manual override for its operation. It is defined as seen in Figure 16a and can be
toggled between automatic and running mode. The modes are similar to those
in the bar screen belt. The automatic mode turns the grit tank pump on and
off periodically according to the control data sent by PLC 2. The running mode
simply keeps the pump running. A digital output of the Y-Box is used to send
the manual override data to PLC 2 (Figure 15).
• Grit Tank Pump Control: While PLC 2 controls the pump operation when the
switch is set to the automatic mode, its command is superseded when the switch
is set to running mode.
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3.2.4.3 PLC and Y-Box Views of the Scenarios.
Under normal operation, it is essential that the views from PLCs and the Y-
Box are nearly equivalent. When the run button is pressed, the simulation follows
the loop process as shown in the Figure 9. Figures 16a, 16b and 16c are captured
simultaneously during the simulation and show the views from PLCs and the Y-Box.
Initial states in Figure 16a are defined once before the simulation starts. The user
defined values in Figure 16a can be adjusted throughout the simulation. Box 2 (in
the user defined values panel) indicate the levels of floats in the wet well and stage 1
of bar screen stage. The floats turn on when its water level is higher (for High or High
High float) or lower (for Low float) than the defined set points. Figure 16a displays
∼50 and ∼7 for wet well and stage 1 levels, respectively, not tripping any floats. Box
2 from Figure 16b shows that the digital inputs of PLC 1 match the Y-Box view as
seen in Figure 16a. The number 1 in Box 3 from Figure 16a indicates auto mode,
matching what is shown in PLC 2 (Figure 16c). Box 5 and 8 in Figure 16a also match
with the status shown in Box 5 in Figure 16b and Box 8 in Figure 16c. For the analog
values in Box 1, 4, 6 and 7, the values between PLCs and Y-Box closely match within
the Y-Box performance error when the PLC percent scale is converted to Y-Box 0 to
1 scale. The exact match of values in Box 7 in Figure 16b and Figure 16c show that
there is a successful communication between PLC 1 and PLC 2 for data exchanges.
Table 4 shows the comparison of analog and digital values in the corresponding
boxes from the simulation and PLCs views.
Table 4. Comparison of the readings from the views of simulation and PLCs
Box Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Simulation 80% All off On 79.023% On 41.808% 21.994% Off
PlCs 79.769% All off On 79.769% On 47.799% 21.811% Off
48
(a) View from Y-Box.
(b) View from PLC 1. (c) View from PLC 2.
Figure 16. Y-Box View vs. PLCs View.
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3.2.4.4 Attacks for Scenarios.
Moreover, a couple of potential attacks, utilizing views from PLCs and the Y-
Box are developed within the simulation scenarios to demonstrate the utility of the
Y-Box. When the attacks are used in an exercise, the ICS operators have the PLC
views where the exercise controllers have both views from PLCs and Y-Box. This way,
the exercise controller can tell immediately when the attackers maliciously modify the
HMI while observing the responses from the ICS operators.
• Attack 1 for Scenario 1: Attack 1 is a configuration modification attack
against PLC 1. PLC 1 includes an automatic scaling feature for configuration
of analog inputs and outputs. Once the scaling values are set by an engineer,
the true analog voltage or current level is hidden from the engineers and the
operators. The only way to detect this modification is to manually examine the
configuration of the PLC or to physically examine the process characteristics.
For this attack, the original scaling range of the analog output that controls the
pump is changed from 0% - 100% to 0% - 80%. This causes an intended control
value of 50% to actually set the pump to 62%, causing the pump to run harder
than intended. Figure 17 shows theimpact of the configuration modification.
The left side shows the Y-Box view of the real actuator value, while the right
side shows the PLC view. This type of attack could be used to interfere with
the physical processes of an ICS or to damage actuators.
• Attack 2 for Scenario 2: Attack 2 utilizes a ladder logic modification to
achieve a similar result on PLC 2. The ladder logic modification causes the
input read by PLC 2 for the flow rate into the grit tank to scale incorrectly.
This causes the PLC to think that less water is flowing into the grit tank than
there really is. The modification is transparent to the operators, and the only
way to detect this change is to manually examine the ladder logic. Figure 18
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Figure 17. Attack 1 example.
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shows the difference between the PLC value and the true value of the flow rate.
This type of attack can be used to interfere a physical process or to influence
billing and accounting data.
Figure 18. Attack 2 example.
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IV. Results and Analysis
The evaluation criteria, environment and scenarios in Section 3.1 are successfully
employed during a military cyber exercise, proving the practicality of the framework
for evaluating the readiness of cyber first responders. The results from the Y-Box
performance test and applications are positive as well. Section 4.1 discusses the results
of framework evaluation. Section 4.2 discusses the results of performance test and
applications of the Y-Box.
4.1 Framework Evaluation Results
In each scenario, the cyber professional team was evaluated against the set criteria
that was derived from the NFPA 1410 concept. The evaluation team was able to
determine the effectiveness of the cyber professional team against a measurable set
of criteria. Based on the results of the exercise using the NFPA 1410 concept, the
evaluation team was allowed to:
• Evaluate the readiness of the cyber professional team to respond effectively to
cyber attacks.
• Determine deficiencies in the cyber professional team’s ability to identify and
mitigate effects from the cyber attacks.
• Determine the ability of the cyber professional team to minimize the cyber
attack effects on the physical processes.
• Identify and map shortfalls in cyber professional team responses to both training
deficiencies and capability deficiencies.
• Provide focused feedback to the cyber professional team on effective tactics and
actions that were not effective.
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• Identify the key indicators used by the cyber professional team to respond to
the attacks.
• Evaluate the utility and effectiveness of the standard operating procedures,
response action plans and cyber defensive tactics, techniques and procedures
manual.
Use of the NFPA 1410 concept was critical for identifying the readiness of the cyber
professional team. Evaluations in previous exercises were not able to tie team actions
directly to requirements and specified evaluation criteria. One of the key advantages
was that the formal process helped drive scenario creation and focus evaluation on
skill sets and actions that cyber first responders would face during an actual event.
Moreover, the results support further exploitation of the custom application for future
simulation of environments.
4.1.1 Recommendations.
Although the initial findings for evaluating cyber first responders using the NFPA
1410 concept is positive, some key challenges were identified during the training ex-
ercise. The first major challenge is the incorporation of an environment that is ade-
quate for training evaluation. A training environment is needed that can be readily
configured to match operational parameters and provide the capability of evaluat-
ing response actions by the cyber first responders. Additionally, organizations must
dedicate resources to identify evaluators and assessment teams that are capable of
implementing the scenarios and exploiting the environment. Finally, the development
of common scenarios similar to the scenarios in NFPA 1410 is needed.
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4.1.2 Limitations in Hardware.
Arduino UNO was able to meet the requirements to simulate a simple physical
process with two different views for the defenders and the coordinators, respectively,
however, some limitations are discovered. First, its inputs and outputs are not mod-
ular, creating difficulty to expand to accommodate specific number of inputs and
outputs from PLCs. Only way would be to increase the number of Arduino UNO.
Second, it is not entirely compatible with typical signal types used in ICS, operating
only in voltage mode. These limitations are heavily considered for the development
of the Y-Box so that it would enhance the framework.
4.2 Y-Box Results
The Y-Box performance test focuses on its accuracy with PLCs. Its applications
focus on the ability to demonstrate representational, realistic and evaluation-friendly
physical processes simulation.
4.2.1 Performance Test.
The experiment measurements are processed to discuss Y-Box performance im-
pacted by calibration, number and types of PLCs connected and analog values. Table
5 describes the overall performance of the Y-Box. In Figures 19, 20, 21 and 22, the
line in the box indicates median while the lower edge and upper edge of the box in-
dicate 1st and 3rd quartiles respectively. The whiskers are considered as boundaries
for the most extreme points. The + symbols are outliers.
4.2.1.1 Calibration Impact.
This section evaluates the calibration impact on the performance of the Y-Box.
Uncalibrated and calibrated measurements are drawn in boxplots to show distribution
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over the performance metric (percent error over range). In both AI and AO, (in
Figures 19a and 19b), the calibrated data show noticeable improvement with a tighter
group closer to 0% error over range than the uncalibrated data. The ideal case is 100%
accuracy with the percent error over range of 0% for all measurements. For all further
results, the calibrated data are used to partially compensate for the inaccuracies
caused by the flaws in the hardware components.
4.2.1.2 Multiple PLCs.
Figure 20 compares Y-Box performance with ControlLogix from the two configu-
rations in Section 3.2.3.5. It is speculated that another power source from Compact-
Logix in the second configuration adds noise to the circuits, potentially affecting the
data measurements for accuracy. Separation of digital and analog grounds in Y-Box
analog modules may be required to account for the difference in performance. For all
further results, measurement data from the second configuration are used to depict
the Y-Box performance.
4.2.1.3 Different PLCs.
Figure 21 compares the Y-Box performance by the types of connected PLCs. Data
for the comparison are collected from the second configuration described in Section
3.2.3.5. One of the major differences between ControlLogix and CompactLogix is the
resolution to detect data changes for their analog modules, possibly explaining the
difference of Y-Box performance with each PLC.
4.2.1.4 Analog Amplitude.
Figure 22 shows the Y-Box performance across its range with varying analog
amplitude. Data for this analysis are also collected from the second configuration
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Figure 19. Comparison between calibrated and uncalibrated data.
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Figure 20. Comparison of Y-Box performance with ControlLogix in experiment 1 and 2.
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Figure 21. Comparison of Y-Box performance with ControlLogix and CompactLogix.
59
described in Section 3.2.3.5. The measurements are sorted according to the five
representational values introduced in Section 3.2.3.6. All measurements except one
in Figures 22a and 22b are within ±0.5% error without an exceptional deviation from
each other. The vast majority of measurements in the experiment are within ±0.25%
of percent error. This points to consistent Y-Box performance regardless of analog
amplitude for input and output.
4.2.1.5 Overall Performance (Analog Modules).
Table 5 shows mean, standard deviation and minimum and maximum percent
error. Table 5 shows the calibrated data from the second configuration as discussed.
Y-Box AI and AO with ControlLogix has the lower mean and standard deviation
than with CompactLogix, suggesting Y-Box performance on accuracy and consistency
varies with respect to the types of PLCs. All maximum values that illustrate the Y-
Box worst performance are measured well within ±0.7%. The minimum values that
illustrate the Y-Box best performance is as low as 0%. While all measurements range
from 0% to ±0.7%, the means for Y-Box AI and AO are less than ±0.1%, significantly
below the acceptable percent error over range proposed in Section 3.2.3.2.
Table 5. Overall system performance.
Mean (%) SD (%) Min (%) Max (%)
Y-Box AIs
ControlLogix 0.076 0.061 0.000 0.647
CompactLogix 0.113 0.113 0.000 0.429
Combined 0.088 0.084 0.000 0.647
Y-Box AOs
ControlLogix 0.073 0.044 0.006 0.188
CompactLogix 0.101 0.095 0.000 0.429
Combined 0.087 0.075 0.000 0.429
60
0   1024 2048 3072 4095
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
P
er
ce
nt
 e
rr
or
 o
ve
r 
ra
ng
e 
(%
)
(a) Analog input.
0   1024 2048 3072 4095
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
P
er
ce
nt
 e
rr
or
 o
ve
r 
ra
ng
e 
(%
)
(b) Analog output.
Figure 22. Comparison of Y-Box performance with different analog amplitudes.
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4.2.1.6 Digital Performance.
As expected, all digital values between the digital modules of Y-Box and PLC
match with 100% accuracy, eliminating the need for further analysis.
4.2.2 Applications.
The Y-Box successfully demonstrats the multiple stages of WWTP by accurately
representing the dependencies between the simulated sensors and actuators. The de-
pendencies are validated by comparing the simulation with the expected behaviors
during the repeated simulation runs. The dependencies are easily adjustable if re-
quired to make the simulation more representational and realistic. As seen in Section
3.2.4.3, the nearly identical views under the normal operation confirm the exchange
of signals with negligible margin of error. In addition, a couple of attack examples
in Section 3.2.4.4 demonstrate that the simulation with the attack scenarios can be
incorporated into a cyber exercise immediately. The similar type of attack was per-
formed as described in Section 3.1.3 and proven effective during the military cyber
exercise.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter summarizes overall conclusions of the previous chapters.
5.1 Conclusions of Research
This research demonstrates the utility of applying the NFPA 1410 concept for
evaluating cyber first responders. Findings from the cyber training exercise demon-
strate that the NFPA 1410 concept enhances the ability to evaluate the readiness of
cyber first responders against real-world scenarios. The results show that the frame-
work provides a means to adequately identify deficiencies in cyber first responders’
ability to identify and mitigate attacks, identify key indicators used to respond to
attacks, and provide feedback to enhance response action and training.
Through the applications, the Y-Box demonstrates its ability to simulate the
complex physical processes by interacting with various types of signals from multiple
PLCs. The performance test of Y-Box demonstrates its precise exchanges of signals
with PLCs, which are required to correctly simulate the physical processes and give
intended signals back to PLCs. Utilizing the Y-box simulation terminal, the physically
observable characteristics are effectively visualized, separate from HMI, to enhance
the evaluation mechanism. Affordable cost to build the Y-Box with its small footprint
demonstrates it is relatively free of resources and geographic constraints.
5.2 Research Hypothesis.
The successful evaluation of cyber first responders in an exercise confirms the hy-
potheses that evaluation method can be developed from the one used for first respon-
ders (e.g., firefighters) and evaluation can be conducted in a simulated environment.
Through the performance test and applications, the Y-Box confirms the hypothesis
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that the simulation tool can interface physical signals, typically used for industrial
applications, from multiple PLCs of different kinds. The Y-Box applications confirm
the hypothesis that physically observable characteristics from the simulated physical
processes can be effectively visualized through a customized graphical interface.
5.3 Significance of Research
The current process for evaluating the readiness of cyber professionals for critical
infrastructure protection is overly reliant upon on exam-based certifications. Un-
fortunately, this process does not provide an adequate ability to examine the true
effectiveness of cyber first responders in real-world scenarios. With attacks targeting
critical infrastructure on the rise and the potential devastating implications to public
safety, it is imperative to find a means to evaluate the readiness of the personnel that
will be the first-line responders. Through this research, the framework for evaluating
the readiness of cyber first responders is carefully developed and its utility is tested.
Based on the positive results from the test, the framework can be expanded to provide
comprehensive and standardized evaluation method for cyber first responders. The
Y-Box can be used to support the effort by facilitating the extension of the scenario
types that require more complex, realistic evaluation environments.
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
The recommendations are collected based on the experience from this research.
5.4.1 Common Scenarios for Evaluation.
This research presents five potential scenarios that are used in a cyber exercise.
Common scenarios that are mapped to reference documents such as the NIST Special
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Publication 800-82 Guide to Industrial Control System Security can be developed to
meet the local and specific needs of evaluation.
5.4.2 Simulation within CPU Module.
This research has a dedicated simulation terminal that connects to the CPU mod-
ule of the Y-Box for the simulation of physical processes. The simulation terminal
requires substantial resources for software license and establishment of its hardware
platform. The cost can be reduced with the development of open source graphic user
interface that can be run within the CPU module.
5.4.3 Physical Processes Simulation Library.
The Y-Box demonstrates the first two stages within WWTP. When more types of
physical processes simulation are added, user-friendly library feature that can select
a desired simulation can support users with limited or no background knowledge on
the Y-Box. The library feature should be accompanied by the PLC ladder logic codes
and specifics on the physical connection between the Y-Box and PLCs. User-friendly
hardware design with more precise components is in progress.
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Appendix A. Y-Box Schematic for Modules
Schematics are drawn by Eagle PCB Design Software using open source library.
A.1 CPU Module
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Appendix B. Microcontroller Code
Codes for microcontrollers are written using the open source Arduino Software.
B.1 CPU Module
//#include <SPI.h>
#include <LiquidCrystal.h>
LiquidCrystal lcd(12, 11, 5, 4, 3, 2);
#define ID_AI 0x52
#define ID_DI 0x53
#define ID_AO 0x54
#define ID_DO 0x55
#define NUM_MODULES 4
#define MOSI_PIN MOSI
#define MISO_PIN MISO
#define SCK_PIN SCK
#define DEMUX_A0 6
#define DEMUX_A1 7
#define DEMUX_A2 8
#define DEMUX_E3 9
#define HB_CMD 0b10101010
#define RDA_CMD 0b01110000
#define WDA_CMD 0b01000000
#define DEFAULT_DELAY 1000
byte module_types[NUM_MODULES];
byte count = 0;
//assign slots
//analog input module in slot 0
byte slotADC = 0;
//digital input module in slot 1
byte slotDI = 1;
//analog output module in slot 2
byte slotDAC = 2;
//digital ouput module in slot 3
byte slotDO = 3;
byte ID;
unsigned short ai_values[8];
unsigned short ao_values[8];
bool di_values[8];
bool do_values[8];
unsigned long last_time;
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unsigned long timestamp;
char input;
char type;
char comma;
char comma2;
char newline;
int channel;
int slot;
int value;
float a_value;
void setup() {
  // set up the LCD's number of columns and rows:
  lcd.begin(16, 2);
  // Print a message to the LCD.
  lcd.print("hello, world!");
  // put your setup code here, to run once:
  pinMode(MOSI_PIN, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(MISO_PIN, INPUT);
  pinMode(SCK_PIN, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(DEMUX_A0, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(DEMUX_A1, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(DEMUX_A2, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(DEMUX_E3, OUTPUT);
  digitalWrite(DEMUX_E3, LOW);
  // This makes the clock rising edge
  digitalWrite(SCK_PIN, LOW);  
  Serial.begin(57600);
  enumerate_modules();
}
void loop(){
  unsigned long newtime;
  //HB_CMD check
  if (count == 0) {
    enumerate_modules();
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  }
  count++;
  if (count >= 100) {
    count = 0;
  }
  update_values();
  // This code measures the amount of time between updating 
the current values
  // This should give us some indication of how fast our 
response time will be
  newtime = millis();
  last_time = newtime - timestamp;
  timestamp = newtime;
  if(Serial.available()){
    input = Serial.read();
    switch(input){
      case 'M':
        newline = Serial.read();
        if(newline != '\n'){
          Serial.println("Invalid Syntax");
          break;
        }
        print_modules();
Serial.println('.');
        break;
      case 'T':
        newline = Serial.read();
        if(newline != '\n'){
          Serial.println("Invalid Syntax");
          break;
        }
        Serial.println(last_time);
        break; 
      case 'R':
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        type = Serial.read();
//slot = Serial.parseInt();
//comma = Serial.read();
        channel = Serial.parseInt();
        newline = Serial.read();
        if(newline != '\n'){
          Serial.println("Invalid Syntax");
          break;
        }        
        if(type == 'D'){
          if(channel > 6){
            Serial.println("Channel out of range");
            break;
          }
          Serial.print("rd");
          Serial.print(channel);
          Serial.print(',');
          Serial.println(di_values[channel]);
        }        
        else if(type == 'A'){
          if(channel > 8){
            Serial.println("Channel out of range");
            break;
          }
          Serial.print("ra");
          Serial.print(channel);
          Serial.print(',');
          Serial.println(ai_values[channel]);
        }       
        else{
          Serial.println("UNKOWN TYPE");
          serialFlush();
        }        
        break; 
      case 'W':
        type = Serial.read();
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        channel = Serial.parseInt();
        comma = Serial.read();
        value = Serial.parseInt();
        newline = Serial.read();        
        if(comma != ',' || newline != '\n'){
          Serial.println("Invalid Syntax");
          break;
        }
        if(type == 'D'){
          if(value > 1){
            Serial.println("Value must be either 0 or 1");
            break;
          }          
          WD(get_slot(ID_DO), channel, value);
          Serial.print("wd");
          Serial.print(channel);
          Serial.print(",");
          Serial.println(value);
        }       
        else if(type == 'A'){
          if(value > 4095){
            Serial.println("Value must be less than 4096");
            break;
          }
          WA(get_slot(ID_AO), channel, value);
          Serial.print("wa");
          Serial.print(channel);
          Serial.print(",");
          Serial.println(value);
        }
        else{
          Serial.println("UNKOWN TYPE");
          serialFlush();
        }        
        break;
    }   
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  }
}
// https://forum.arduino.cc/index.php?topic=234151.0
void serialFlush(){
  while(Serial.available()) {
    Serial.read();
  }
}
void update_values(){
  for(byte i=0; i < NUM_MODULES; i++){
    switch(module_types[i]){
      case ID_AI:
        update_AI(i);
      break;
      case ID_DI:
        update_DI(i);
      break;
      /*
      case ID_AO:
        update_AO(i);
      break;
      case ID_DO:
        update_DO(i);
      break;
      */
    }
  }
}
void update_AI(byte slot){
  for(int i=0; i < 8; i++){
    ai_values[i] = RA(slot, i);
  }
}
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void update_DI(byte slot){
  byte vals = RDA(slot);
  for(byte i=0; i < 8; i++){
    di_values[i] = (vals >> (7-i)) & 1;
  } 
}
// This helper function returns the slot number of the first
// module that matches the given ID
byte get_slot(byte id){
  for(byte slot=0; slot < NUM_MODULES; slot++){
    if(module_types[slot] == id){
      return slot;
    }
  }
  return 0xFF;
}
void enumerate_modules(){
  for(byte i=0; i < NUM_MODULES; i++){
    module_types[i] = sendHB_CMD(i);
    if( ! ((module_types[i] >= ID_AI && module_types[i] <= 
ID_DO) || module_types[i] == 0)){
      Serial.print("Unexpected module type (");
      Serial.print(module_types[i]);
      Serial.print(") found on slot: ");
      Serial.println(i);
    }
  }
}
void print_modules(){
  for(byte i=0; i < NUM_MODULES; i++){
    Serial.print("Slot # ");
    Serial.print(i);
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    Serial.print(": "); 
    switch(module_types[i]){
      case ID_AI:
        Serial.println("Analog Input");
      break;
      case ID_DI:
        Serial.println("Digital Input");
      break;
      case ID_AO:
        Serial.println("Analog Output");
      break;
      case ID_DO:
        Serial.println("Digital Output");
      break;
      default:
        Serial.println("Empty");
      break;
    }
  }
}
void print_test(){
  //ADC
  byte channelADC0 = 7;
  unsigned short ADC_value0 = RA(slotADC, channelADC0);
  Serial.print("ADC Value 0: ");
  Serial.println(ADC_value0);
  //delay(1000);
  //Digital Input 
  byte channelDI0 = 1;
  byte DI_value0 = RD(slotDI, channelDI0);
  byte DI_values =  RDA(slotDI);
  Serial.print("DI: ");
  Serial.println(DI_value0);
  Serial.print("DIs: ");
  Serial.println(DI_values);
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  //delay(1000);
  //DAC
  //channel from 0 to 7, total 8 channels
  byte channelDAC1 = 1;
  //with channel and first 4 bits, first bit is 0
  byte byte0_DAC1 = 4;
  //8 lower data bits
  byte byte1_DAC1 = 0;
  //write the anlaog values to DAC
  byte DAC_channel = WA (slotDAC, channelDAC1, byte0_DAC1, 
byte1_DAC1);
  Serial.print("DAC channel: ");
  Serial.println(DAC_channel);
  //delay(1000);
  //  digital ouput
  //get a single digital value to write
  byte DO5 = 1;
  //get all dital values to write, MSB first, starting with 
channel 0
  byte DOs = 0b11110000;
  byte DO_channel = WD (slotDO, 5, DO5);
  byte DO_all = WDA (slotDO, DOs);
  delay(1000);
  Serial.print("DO channel: ");
  Serial.println(DO_channel);
  Serial.print("DO all: ");
  Serial.println(DO_all);
}
void selectSlot (byte slot){
digitalWrite(DEMUX_A2, (slot >> 2) & 1);
digitalWrite(DEMUX_A1, (slot >> 1) & 1);
digitalWrite(DEMUX_A0, slot & 1);
digitalWrite(DEMUX_E3, HIGH);
}
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void disableSlot(){
digitalWrite(DEMUX_E3, LOW);
}
void send_cmd(byte slot, byte data){
selectSlot(slot);
delayMicroseconds(DEFAULT_DELAY);
shiftOut(MOSI_PIN, SCK_PIN, MSBFIRST, data);
}
void send_cmd(byte slot, byte data1, byte data2){
selectSlot(slot);
delayMicroseconds(DEFAULT_DELAY);
shiftOut(MOSI_PIN, SCK_PIN, MSBFIRST, data1);
delayMicroseconds(DEFAULT_DELAY);
shiftOut(MOSI_PIN, SCK_PIN, MSBFIRST, data2);
}
byte recv(bool disable_slot=true){
byte ID = shiftIn(MISO_PIN, SCK_PIN, MSBFIRST);
if(disable_slot){
disableSlot();
}
return ID;
}
byte sendHB_CMD(byte slot){
  byte resp;  
  send_cmd(slot, HB_CMD);  
  delayMicroseconds(DEFAULT_DELAY);  
  resp = recv();  
  return resp;
}
unsigned short RA(byte slot, byte channel){  
  unsigned short dataADC;  
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  send_cmd(slot, channel);  
  //time needed for ATTINY to bring data from the selected ADC
channel
  //~~9 ms required for the readADC function to finish
  delayMicroseconds(DEFAULT_DELAY);//give extra 11 ms  
  //read first byte
  dataADC = recv(false);  
  //time needed for next byte to be in USIDR
  delayMicroseconds(DEFAULT_DELAY);  
  dataADC = (dataADC << 8) | recv();  
  return dataADC;
}
byte RD (byte slot, byte channel){    
  byte dataDI;
send_cmd(slot, channel);
//time needed for ATTINY to bring data from the selected DI 
channel
  delayMicroseconds(DEFAULT_DELAY);
dataDI = recv();
  return dataDI;
}
byte RDA (byte slot){
  byte dataDI_A; 
send_cmd(slot, RDA_CMD);
delayMicroseconds(DEFAULT_DELAY);
  dataDI_A = recv();
  return dataDI_A;
}
// is_current is 0 for Volts, 1 for Amps
byte WA(byte slot, byte channel, float value, bool 
is_current){
  unsigned short val;
  // This means Current, 0.0 - 20.0
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  if(is_current){
     val = (unsigned short)(4095.0 * value / 20.0);
  }
  else{
    // This is volts!
    val = (unsigned short)(4095.0 * value / 10.0);
  }
  return WA(slot, channel, val);
}
byte WA(byte slot, byte channel, unsigned short value){
  return WA(slot, channel, highByte(value), lowByte(value));
}
byte WA(byte slot, byte channel, byte value0, byte value1){
  byte cmd;  
  //combine channel information and first 4 bits in the first 
byte
  //firt bit is 0
  cmd = (channel << 4) | value0;
  send_cmd(slot, cmd, value1);  
  delayMicroseconds(5000); 
  // ATTINY must return a byte acknowledging that the write 
command was successful
  // ATTINY should send the channel that was written
  return recv();
}
byte WD (byte slot, byte channel, byte value) {
  //combine channel information and digital value
  byte cmd = (channel << 1) | value; 
  send_cmd(slot, cmd);
  //time needed for ATTINY to do digitalRead
  delayMicroseconds(DEFAULT_DELAY);
  // ATTINY must return a byte acknowledging that the write 
command was successful
82
  // ATTINY should send the channel that was written
  return recv();
}
byte WDA (byte slot, byte values){
  byte cmd1 = WDA_CMD | (values >> 2);
byte cmd2 = values << 6;
send_cmd(slot, cmd1, cmd2);
delayMicroseconds(DEFAULT_DELAY);
  // ATTINY must return a byte acknowledging that the write 
command was successful
  // ATTINY should send 10 when write command all was 
successful
return recv();   
}
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#include <avr/io.h>
#include <avr/interrupt.h>
#include <avr/power.h>
#include <avr/sleep.h>
//set bit in I/O register
#ifndef cbi
#define sbi(sfr, bit) (_SFR_BYTE(sfr) |= _BV(bit)) //OR
#endif
//clear bit in I/O register
#ifndef sbi
#define cbi(sfr, bit) (_SFR_BYTE(sfr) &= ~_BV(bit)) //AND
#endif
#define MOSI_A 6
#define MISO_A 5
#define SCK_A 4
#define CS_A PCINT7
#define SCK_ADC 10
#define MISO_ADC 9
#define CS_ADC 8
#define MOSI_ADC 0
#define NUM_CHANNELS 8
unsigned short current_values[NUM_CHANNELS];
// the setup function runs once when you press reset or power 
the board
void setup() {
  cli();//Global Interrupt Disable, disable interrupts during 
setup 
  pinMode(MOSI_A, INPUT); 
  //change to input for MISO_A to make it high impedance
  pinMode(MISO_A, INPUT); 
  pinMode(SCK_A, INPUT);
  pinMode(CS_A, INPUT);
  pinMode(MOSI_ADC, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(MISO_ADC, INPUT);
  pinMode(SCK_ADC, OUTPUT);
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  pinMode(CS_ADC, OUTPUT);
  //Clock idles at low, 0 mode
  digitalWrite(SCK_ADC, LOW); 
  digitalWrite(CS_ADC, HIGH);
  sbi(GIMSK,PCIE0); // Turn on Pin Change interrupt
  sbi(PCMSK0,CS_A); // Which pins are affected by the interrup
  spiSlaveInit();
  clear_values();
  sei(); //last line of setup - enable interrupts after setup
}
// the loop function runs over and over again forever
void loop() {
  update_values();
}
ISR(PCINT0_vect) {
  if ((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1){
    resetCounter();
  }
  byte pinState = digitalRead(CS_A);//gives PORTA7 value, 
PCINT7
  if (!pinState) {
    //wait until 16 edges to finish 8 bit transfer for shiftOu
    //make sure USIDR is full with ADC channel information
    //ensure USIOIF is 0 before while loop
    //make MISO output mode to transmit data to Arduino Micro
    pinMode(MISO_A, OUTPUT);
    while(!((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1));
    //write one bit to USIOIF
    resetCounter();
    byte channel = USIDR; 
    if (((channel >> 7) & 1) == 1){
      USIDR = 0x52;
    }
    else { 
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      //read digital number from the ADC, take some time
      unsigned short dataBytes = current_values[channel];
      byte dataBytes0 = highByte(dataBytes);
      byte dataBytes1 = lowByte(dataBytes);
      USIDR = dataBytes0;
      //wait until first shiftIn is done
      while(!((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1));
      resetCounter();
      //write for the second shiftIn
      USIDR = dataBytes1;
    }
  }
  else{
    //make MISO input
    pinMode(MISO_A, INPUT);
  } 
}
void clear_values(){
  for(int i=0; i < NUM_CHANNELS; i++){
    current_values[i] = 0;
  }
}
void update_values(){
  for(int i=0; i < NUM_CHANNELS; i++){
    current_values[i] = readADC(i);
    //delay(1);
  }
}
unsigned short readADC(byte channel){
    unsigned short RequestBytes = (0b00011000 + channel) << 6;
    //noInterrupts();
    digitalWrite(CS_ADC, LOW);
    ytransfer(MOSI_ADC, MISO_ADC, SCK_ADC, MSBFIRST, 
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highByte(RequestBytes));
    byte data0 = ytransfer(MOSI_ADC, MISO_ADC, SCK_ADC, 
MSBFIRST, lowByte(RequestBytes));
    byte data1 = ytransfer(MOSI_ADC, MISO_ADC, SCK_ADC, 
MSBFIRST, 0x00);
    digitalWrite(CS_ADC, HIGH);
    //interrupts();
    data0 &= 0b00001111;
    unsigned short bitsADC = (((unsigned short)data0) << 8) | 
data1;
    return bitsADC;   
}
void resetCounter(){
  USISR =  1 << USIOIF;
}
// Initialise as SPI slave
void spiSlaveInit()
{
  USICR = (1 << USIWM0) // SPI mode
          |(0 << USIWM1) // Three Wire Mode
          |(1 << USICS1); // Clock is external   
}
byte ytransfer(uint8_t MOSI, uint8_t MISO, uint8_t clockPin, 
uint8_t bitOrder, byte val)
{
      int i;
      byte data = 0;
      for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)  {
        if (bitOrder == LSBFIRST){
          digitalWrite(MOSI, !!(val & (1 << i)));
          data |= digitalRead(MISO) << i;
        }     
        else{   
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          digitalWrite(MOSI, !!(val & (1 << (7 - i))));
          data |= digitalRead(MISO) << (7 - i);
        }              
        digitalWrite(clockPin, HIGH);
        digitalWrite(clockPin, LOW);     
      }
      return data;
}
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#include <avr/io.h>
#include <avr/interrupt.h>
#include <avr/power.h>
#include <avr/sleep.h>
//set bit in I/O register
#ifndef cbi
#define sbi(sfr, bit) (_SFR_BYTE(sfr) |= _BV(bit)) //OR
#endif
//clear bit in I/O register
#ifndef sbi
#define cbi(sfr, bit) (_SFR_BYTE(sfr) &= ~_BV(bit)) //AND
#endif
#define CS_A PCINT7
#define MOSI_A 6
#define MISO_A 5
#define SCK_A 4
#define SCK_DAC 10
#define MOSI_DAC 9
#define CS_DAC0 0
#define CS_DAC1 1
#define CS_DAC2 2
#define CS_DAC3 3
// the setup function runs once when you press reset or power 
the board
void setup() {
  cli();//Global Interrupt Disable, disable interrupts during 
setup
  pinMode(MOSI_A, INPUT); 
 //change to input for MISO_A to make it high impedance
  pinMode(MISO_A, INPUT); 
  pinMode(SCK_A, INPUT);
  pinMode(CS_A, INPUT);
  pinMode(MOSI_DAC, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(SCK_DAC, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(CS_DAC0, OUTPUT);
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  pinMode(CS_DAC1, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(CS_DAC2, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(CS_DAC3, OUTPUT);
  //Clock idles at low, 0 mode
  digitalWrite(SCK_DAC, LOW); 
  digitalWrite(CS_DAC0, HIGH);
  digitalWrite(CS_DAC1, HIGH);
  digitalWrite(CS_DAC2, HIGH);
  digitalWrite(CS_DAC3, HIGH);
  sbi(GIMSK,PCIE0); // Turn on Pin Change interrupt
  sbi(PCMSK0,CS_A); // Which pins are affected by the interrup
  spiSlaveInit();
  sei(); //last line of setup - enable interrupts after setup
}
// the loop function runs over and over again forever
void loop() {}
ISR(PCINT0_vect) {
  if ((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1){
    resetCounter();
  }
  byte pinState = digitalRead(CS_A);//gives PORTA7 value, 
PCINT7  
  if (!pinState) {    
    //make MISO output mode to transmit data to Arduino Micro
    pinMode(MISO_A, OUTPUT); 
    while(!((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1)){
    }
    resetCounter();//write one bit to USIOIF
    unsigned short command = USIDR;
    if (((command >> 7) & 1) == 1){
      USIDR = 0x54;
    }
    else{      
    while(!((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1));
    resetCounter();    
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    byte dataByte = USIDR;   
    //combine data to send to DAC
    byte channel = command >> 4;
    unsigned short data = ((command & 0b00001111) << 8) | 
dataByte;
    //takes time for this function
    sendtoDAC(data, channel);  
    USIDR = channel;
    } 
  }
  else{
    //make MISO input
    pinMode(MISO_A, INPUT);
  }  
}
void resetCounter(){
  USISR = 1 << USIOIF;
}
// Initialise as SPI slave
void spiSlaveInit()
{
  USICR = (1 << USIWM0) // SPI mode
          |(0 << USIWM1) // Three Wire Mode
          |(1 << USICS1); // Clock is external   
}
void sendtoDAC (unsigned short value, byte addr){  
  byte CS;
  if ((addr == 0)||(addr == 1)){
    CS = CS_DAC0;
    }
  if ((addr == 2)||(addr == 3)){
    CS = CS_DAC1;
    }
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  if ((addr == 4)||(addr == 5)){
    CS = CS_DAC2;
    }
  if ((addr == 6)||(addr == 7)){
    CS = CS_DAC3;
    }   
  byte defaultfirstByte = 0b00110000;
  byte firstByteData = highByte(value)| defaultfirstByte;
  byte secondByteData = lowByte(value);
  byte channelBit = (addr & 1) << 7;//0 is channel 0, 1 is 
channel 1  
  byte firstByteDAC = channelBit | firstByteData;
  byte secondByteDAC = secondByteData;   
  noInterrupts();
  digitalWrite (CS, LOW);
  shiftOut(MOSI_DAC, SCK_DAC, MSBFIRST, firstByteDAC);
  shiftOut(MOSI_DAC, SCK_DAC, MSBFIRST, secondByteDAC);
  digitalWrite (CS, HIGH);  
  interrupts();
 }
92
#include <avr/io.h>
#include <avr/interrupt.h>
#include <avr/power.h>
#include <avr/sleep.h
//set bit in I/O register
#ifndef cbi
#define sbi(sfr, bit) (_SFR_BYTE(sfr) |= _BV(bit)) //OR
#endif
//clear bit in I/O register
#ifndef sbi
#define cbi(sfr, bit) (_SFR_BYTE(sfr) &= ~_BV(bit)) //AND
#endif
#define CS_A PCINT7
#define MOSI_A 6
#define MISO_A 5
#define SCK_A 4
#define DI0 10
#define DI1 9
#define DI2 8
#define DI3 0
#define DI4 1
#define DI5 2
#define DI6 3
#define NUM_CHANNELS 7
byte current_values[NUM_CHANNELS];
// the setup function runs once when you press reset or power 
the board
void setup() {
  cli();//Global Interrupt Disable, disable interrupts during 
setup 
  pinMode(MOSI_A, INPUT);
  //change to input for MISO_A to make it high impedance
  pinMode(MISO_A, INPUT);
  pinMode(SCK_A, INPUT);
  pinMode(CS_A, INPUT);
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  pinMode(DI0, INPUT);
  pinMode(DI1, INPUT);
  pinMode(DI2, INPUT);
  pinMode(DI3, INPUT);
  pinMode(DI4, INPUT);
  pinMode(DI5, INPUT);
  pinMode(DI6, INPUT);
  sbi(GIMSK,PCIE0); // Turn on Pin Change interrupt
  sbi(PCMSK0,CS_A); // Which pins are affected by the interrup
  spiSlaveInit();
  sei(); //last line of setup - enable interrupts after setup
}
// the loop function runs over and over again forever
void loop() {
  update_values();
}
ISR(PCINT0_vect) {  
  if ((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1){
    resetCounter();
  }
  byte pinState = digitalRead(CS_A);//gives PORTA7 value, 
PCINT7
  if (!pinState) { 
    //make MISO output mode to transmit data to Arduino Micro
    pinMode(MISO_A, OUTPUT);   
    while(!((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1));
    resetCounter();
    byte cmd = USIDR;
    //if Hearbeat ID
    if (((cmd >> 7) & 1) == 1){
        USIDR = 0x53;
    }
    else if ((cmd >> 6) == 1){   
      byte DIs;
94
      DIs = (current_values[0] << 7)
            |(current_values[1] << 6)
            |(current_values[2] << 5)
            |(current_values[3] << 4)
            |(current_values[4] << 3)
            |(current_values[5] << 2)
            |(current_values[6] << 1); 
      USIDR = DIs;       
    }
    else{
      USIDR = current_values[cmd];
    }
  }
  else{
    //make MISO input
    pinMode(MISO_A, INPUT);
  }
}
void resetCounter(){
  USISR = 1 << USIOIF;
}
void spiSlaveInit()
{
  USICR = (1 << USIWM0) // SPI mode
          |(0 << USIWM1) // Three Wire Mode
          |(1 << USICS1); // Clock is external   
}
byte readDI (byte addr){
  byte DI;
  if (addr == 0){
    DI = digitalRead(DI0);
    }
  if (addr == 1){
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    DI = digitalRead(DI1);
    }
  if (addr == 2){
    DI = digitalRead(DI2);
    }
  if (addr == 3){
    DI = digitalRead(DI3);
    }
  if (addr == 4){
    DI = digitalRead(DI4);
    }
  if (addr == 5){
    DI = digitalRead(DI5);
    }
  if (addr == 6){
    DI = digitalRead(DI6);
    }
    return DI;
}
void update_values(){
  for(int i=0; i < NUM_CHANNELS; i++){
    current_values[i] = readDI(i);
    //delay(1);
  }
}
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#include <avr/io.h>
#include <avr/interrupt.h>
#include <avr/power.h>
#include <avr/sleep.h>
//set bit in I/O register
#ifndef cbi
#define sbi(sfr, bit) (_SFR_BYTE(sfr) |= _BV(bit)) //OR
#endif
//clear bit in I/O register
#ifndef sbi
#define cbi(sfr, bit) (_SFR_BYTE(sfr) &= ~_BV(bit)) //AND
#endif
#define CS_A PCINT7
#define MOSI_A 6
#define MISO_A 5
#define SCK_A 4
#define DO0 10
#define DO1 9
#define DO2 8
#define DO3 0
#define DO4 1
#define DO5 2
#define DO6 3
// the setup function runs once when you press reset or power 
the board
void setup() {
  cli();//Global Interrupt Disable, disable interrupts during 
setup
  pinMode(MOSI_A, INPUT); 
  //change to input for MISO_A to make it high impedance
  pinMode(MISO_A, INPUT); 
  pinMode(SCK_A, INPUT);
  pinMode(CS_A, INPUT);
  pinMode(DO0, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(DO1, OUTPUT);
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  pinMode(DO2, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(DO3, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(DO4, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(DO5, OUTPUT);
  pinMode(DO6, OUTPUT);
  sbi(GIMSK,PCIE0); // Turn on Pin Change interrupt
  sbi(PCMSK0,CS_A); // Which pins are affected by the interrup
  spiSlaveInit();
  sei(); //last line of setup - enable interrupts after setup
}
// the loop function runs over and over again forever
void loop() {}
ISR(PCINT0_vect) { 
  //if ((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1){
    resetCounter();
  //}  
  byte pinState = digitalRead(CS_A);//gives PORTA7 value, 
PCINT7 
  if (!pinState) {
    //make MISO output mode to transmit data to Arduino Micro
    pinMode(MISO_A, OUTPUT);    
    while(!((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1));
    byte cmd1 = USIDR;
      //if Hearbeat ID
      if (((cmd1 >> 7) & 1) == 1){
          USIDR = 0x55;
      }
      else {
        if ((cmd1 >> 6) == 1){
          resetCounter();        
          while(!((USISR >> USIOIF) & 1));         
          byte cmd2 = USIDR;      
          byte DOs = (cmd1 << 2) | (cmd2 >> 6); 
          //to indicate the completion of write all         
          digitalWrite(DO0, (DOs >> 7) & 1);
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          digitalWrite(DO1, (DOs >> 6) & 1);
          digitalWrite(DO2, (DOs >> 5) & 1);
          digitalWrite(DO3, (DOs >> 4) & 1);
          digitalWrite(DO4, (DOs >> 3) & 1);
          digitalWrite(DO5, (DOs >> 2) & 1);
          digitalWrite(DO6, (DOs >> 1) & 1);
          USIDR = 10;           
        }
        else{
          writeDO(cmd1);
        }
      }
  }
   else{
    //make MISO input
    pinMode(MISO_A, INPUT);
  } 
}
void resetCounter(){
  USISR = 1 << USIOIF;
}
void spiSlaveInit()
{
  USICR = (1 << USIWM0) // SPI mode
          |(0 << USIWM1) // Three Wire Mode
          |(1 << USICS1); // Clock is external   
}
void writeDO (byte channel_value){
  byte addr = channel_value >> 1;
  byte value = channel_value & 1;
  if (addr == 0){
    digitalWrite(DO0, value);
    USIDR = 0;
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  else if (addr == 1){
    digitalWrite(DO1, value);
    USIDR = 1;
    }
  else if (addr == 2){
    digitalWrite(DO2, value);
    USIDR = 2;
    }
  else if (addr == 3){
    digitalWrite(DO3, value);
    USIDR = 3;
    }
  else if (addr == 4){
    digitalWrite(DO4, value);
    USIDR = 4;
    }
  else if (addr == 5){
    digitalWrite(DO5, value);
    USIDR = 5;
    }
  else {
    digitalWrite(DO6, value);
    USIDR = 6;
    }
}
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Appendix C. Simulation code for WWTP stages
function varargout = screen_GUI_resizedS2(varargin)
gui_Singleton = 1;
gui_State = struct('gui_Name',       mfilename, ...
                   'gui_Singleton',  gui_Singleton, ...
                   'gui_OpeningFcn', @screen_GUI_resizedS2_OpeningFcn, 
...
                   'gui_OutputFcn',  @screen_GUI_resizedS2_OutputFcn, 
...
                   'gui_LayoutFcn',  [], ...
                   'gui_Callback',   []);
if nargin && ischar(varargin{1})
   gui_State.gui_Callback = str2func(varargin{1});
end
 
if nargout
    [varargout{1:nargout}] = gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:});
else
    gui_mainfcn(gui_State, varargin{:});
end
 
function screen_GUI_resizedS2_OpeningFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles, 
varargin)
handles.output = hObject;
guidata(hObject, handles);
 
function varargout = screen_GUI_resizedS2_OutputFcn(hObject, eventdata, 
handles)
varargout{1} = handles.output;
 
function init_S1_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
init_S1 = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','init_S1',init_S1)
set(handles.init_S1Num,'String',num2str(init_S1))
 
function init_S1_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function init_Clog_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
init_Clog = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','init_Clog',init_Clog)
set(handles.init_ClogNum,'String',num2str(init_Clog))
 
function init_Clog_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
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if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function init_S2_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
init_S2 = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','init_S2',init_S2)
set(handles.init_S2Num,'String',num2str(init_S2))
 
function init_S2_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function init_Tank_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
init_Tank = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','init_Tank',init_Tank)
set(handles.init_TankNum,'String',num2str(init_Tank))
 
function init_Tank_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function in_Flow_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
in_Flow = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','in_Flow',in_Flow)
set(handles.in_FlowNum,'String',num2str(in_Flow))
 
function in_Flow_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function f_Level_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
f_Level = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','f_Level',f_Level)
set(handles.f_LevelNum,'String',num2str(f_Level))
 
function f_Level_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
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    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
% --------------------------------------------------------------------
function screen_simulation_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
 
function out_Rate_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
out_Rate = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','out_Rate',out_Rate)
set(handles.out_RateNum,'String',num2str(out_Rate))
 
function out_Rate_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function t_Rate_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
t_Rate = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','t_Rate',t_Rate)
set(handles.t_RateNum,'String',num2str(t_Rate))
 
function t_Rate_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function s1_Low_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
s1_Low = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','s1_Low',s1_Low)
set(handles.s1_LowNum,'String',num2str(s1_Low))
 
function s1_Low_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function s1_High_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
s1_High = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','s1_High',s1_High)
set(handles.s1_HighNum,'String',num2str(s1_High))
 
function s1_High_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
103
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function s1_HighHigh_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
s1_HighHigh = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','s1_HighHigh',s1_HighHigh)
set(handles.s1_HighHighNum,'String',num2str(s1_HighHigh))
 
function s1_HighHigh_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function t_Low_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
t_Low = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','t_Low',t_Low)
set(handles.t_LowNum,'String',num2str(t_Low))
 
function t_Low_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function t_High_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
t_High = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','t_High',t_High)
set(handles.t_HighNum,'String',num2str(t_High))
 
function t_High_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function t_HighHigh_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
t_HighHigh = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','t_HighHigh',t_HighHigh)
set(handles.t_HighHighNum,'String',num2str(t_HighHigh))
 
function t_HighHigh_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
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end
 
function run_Screen_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
 
delete(instrfindall)
%establish connection with micro
micro = serial('COM21', 'BaudRate', 57600);
 
%open serial port
fopen(micro);
 
%connection test
fprintf(micro,'M');
connection_test = [{fscanf(micro)}; {fscanf(micro)}; {fscanf(micro)};...
    {fscanf(micro)}; {fscanf(micro)}]
assignin('base','connection_test',connection_test)
 
%Scenario 1
%for initial tank level
t_Level = get(handles.init_Tank,'Value');
%for initial s1 and s2 level
s1_Level = get(handles.init_S1,'Value'); 
s2_Level = get(handles.init_S2,'Value');
%for initial clog level
b_Clog = get(handles.init_Clog,'Value');
 
%Scenario 2
 
for a = 1:200
%for Scenario 1    
%stage 1 floats
%Low for the tank level
s1_LSL = get(handles.s1_Low,'Value');
%High for the tank level
s1_LSH = get(handles.s1_High,'Value');
%High High for the tank level
s1_LSHH = get(handles.s1_HighHigh,'Value');
 
%wet well tank floats
%Low for the wet well tank level
t_LSL = get(handles.t_Low,'Value');
%High High for the wet well tank level
t_LSHH = get(handles.t_HighHigh,'Value');
 
%for Scenario 1
%user defined values
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%filth level from the tank
f_Level = get(handles.f_Level,'Value');
 
%Clog clean rate when belt is moving
c_Rate = get(handles.c_Rate,'Value');
 
maxS1 = 20;
maxTank = 100;
maxG = 100
 
DO = [{'WD0'},{'WD1'},{'WD2'},{'WD3'},{'WD4'},{'WD5'},{'WD6'}];
g_Mode = get(handles.g_Mode,'Value');
fprintf(micro,[DO{5},',',num2str(g_Mode),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
 
%Analog Outputs
AO = [{'WA0'},{'WA1'},{'WA2'},{'WA3'},{'WA4'},{'WA5'},{'WA6'},{'WA7'}];
 
%Analog output: in_Flow rate to the tank
in_Flow = get(handles.in_Flow,'Value');
AO_value = floor(in_Flow * 4095); AO_ch = 1;
fprintf(micro,[AO{AO_ch},',',num2str(AO_value),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
 
%Analog output: Level difference between stage 1 and stage 2
d_Level = s1_Level - s2_Level;
AO_value = floor(d_Level * 4095 / maxS1); AO_ch = 2;
fprintf(micro,[AO{AO_ch},',',num2str(AO_value),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
 
%Digital outputs: three digital ouputs for stage 1 floats    
if s1_Level > s1_LSHH
    DO_s1L = 0; DO_s1H = 1; DO_s1HH = 1;
else if s1_Level > s1_LSH
        DO_s1L = 0; DO_s1H = 1; DO_s1HH = 0;
    else if s1_Level < s1_LSL
        DO_s1L = 1; DO_s1H = 0; DO_s1HH = 0;
        else
            DO_s1L = 0; DO_s1H = 0; DO_s1HH = 0;
        end
    end
end
 
%Low float sensor for stage 1
fprintf(micro,[DO{1},',',num2str(DO_s1L),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
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%High float sensor for stage 1
fprintf(micro,[DO{2},',',num2str(mod(DO_s1H + 1, 2)),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
%High High float sensor for stage 1
fprintf(micro,[DO{3},',',num2str(mod(DO_s1HH + 1, 2)),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
 
%%Digital outputs: three digital outputs for tank floats
if t_Level > t_LSHH
    DO_tL = 0; DO_tH = 1; DO_tHH = 1;
    else if t_Level < t_LSL
        DO_tL = 1; DO_tH = 0; DO_tHH = 0;
        else
            DO_tL = 0; DO_tH = 0; DO_tHH = 0;
        end
end
 
%Low float sensor for wet well
fprintf(micro,[DO{4},',',num2str(DO_tL),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
%High High float sensor for wet well
fprintf(micro,[DO{6},',',num2str(mod(DO_tHH + 1, 2)),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
 
%Inputs
%Analog Input
%pump speed is the amound of water going into the screen
AI_ch = 1;
AI = [{'RA0'},{'RA1'},{'RA2'},{'RA3'},{'RA4'},{'RA5'},{'RA6'},{'RA7'}];
fprintf(micro,[AI{AI_ch},'\n']);
AI_value{AI_ch} = fscanf(micro);
AI_value{AI_ch} = str2num(AI_value{AI_ch}(5:end));
p_Speed = AI_value{AI_ch} / 4095;
 
%Pump speed feedback analog output
p_FB = p_Speed;
AO_value = floor(p_FB * 4095); AO_ch = 6;
fprintf(micro,[AO{AO_ch},',',num2str(AO_value),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
 
%Digital Input
DI_ch = 1;
DI = [{'RD0'},{'RD1'},{'RD2'},{'RD3'},{'RD4'},{'RD5'},{'RD6'}];
fprintf(micro, [DI{DI_ch},'\n']);
DI_value{DI_ch} = fscanf(micro);
DI_value{DI_ch} = str2num(DI_value{DI_ch}(5:end));
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b_Mode = DI_value{DI_ch};
 
%Clog gets removed when belt is running otherwise keeps getting clogged
%according to the filthy level
b_Clog = b_Clog - b_Mode * c_Rate + f_Level * p_Speed;
 
%clog percent should be between 0 and 100%
if b_Clog > 1
    b_Clog = 1;
end
if b_Clog < 0
    b_Clog = 0;
end
 
%tank level is added with in_Flow and substracted from the water going 
into
%the stage 1
t_Level = (t_Level + in_Flow) - p_Speed;
 
%when tank level is 100, the excess water overflows into the reserve 
tank
%tank level doesn't decrease in this set up
if t_Level > maxTank
    t_Level = maxTank;
end
%can't be less than 0
if t_Level < 0
        t_Level = 0;
end
 
stage_transfer = ((s1_Level - s2_Level) * (1 - b_Clog));
 
%stage 1 level dependent on clog level, transfer rate, level difference
%and in_Flow rate given by pump speed
s1_Level = s1_Level + p_Speed - stage_transfer;
 
%in_Flow more than the stage 1 capacity then it overflows
if s1_Level > maxS1
    s1_Level = maxS1;
end
%can'b be less than 0
if s1_Level < 0
    s1_Level = 0;
end
 
%This goes to CompactLogix
108
%Analog output: out_Flow rate from stage 2
%out_Flow indicates the flow going out from stage 2 in each iteration
out_Flow = stage_transfer;
AO_value = floor(out_Flow * 4095 / 20); AO_ch = 5;
fprintf(micro,[AO{AO_ch},',',num2str(AO_value),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
 
%Scenario 2
%Digital Input for grit tank pump
DI_ch = 2;
fprintf(micro, [DI{DI_ch},'\n']);
DI_value{DI_ch} = fscanf(micro);
DI_value{DI_ch} = str2num(DI_value{DI_ch}(5:end));
g_Pump = DI_value{DI_ch};
 
%Digital Output for grit tank pump feedback
g_PumpFB = g_Pump;
fprintf(micro,[DO{7},',',num2str(g_PumpFB),'\n']);
fscanf(micro)
 
a = a + 1;
 
axes(handles.axes1);
    bar(t_Level); grid on;
    set(gca,'xticklabel',[]) 
    ylim([0 100]);
    xlabel(num2str(t_Level));
    r1 = refline(0,t_LSL);
    r3 = refline(0,t_LSHH);
    set(r1, 'color','c')
    text(1.5,t_LSL,{'Low'; 'Float'},'FontSize',6)
    set(r3, 'color','r')
    text(1.5,t_LSHH,{'High High'; 'Float'},'FontSize',6)
axes(handles.axes2);
    bar(s1_Level); grid on;
    set(gca,'xticklabel',[]) 
    ylim([0 20]);
    xlabel(num2str(s1_Level));
    r1 = refline(0,s1_LSL);
    r2 = refline(0,s1_LSH);
    r3 = refline(0,s1_LSHH);
    set(r1, 'color','c')
    text(1.5,s1_LSL,{'Low'; 'Float'},'FontSize',6)
    set(r2, 'color','y')
    text(1.5,s1_LSH,{'High'; 'Float'},'FontSize',6)
    set(r3, 'color','r')
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    text(1.5,s1_LSHH,{'High High'; 'Float'},'FontSize',6)
axes(handles.axes3);
    bar(s2_Level); grid on;
    set(gca,'xticklabel',[]) 
    ylim([0 20]);
    xlabel(num2str(s2_Level));
axes(handles.axes4);
    bar(p_Speed); grid on;
    set(gca,'xticklabel',[]) 
    ylim([0 1]);
    xlabel(num2str(p_Speed));
axes(handles.axes5);
if b_Mode == 1
    plot(.5,'o','MarkerEdgeColor','r','MarkerSize',
20,'MarkerFaceColor','g');
    set(gca,'xticklabel',[],'yticklabel',[]) 
    ylim([0 1]);
else
    plot(.5,'o','MarkerEdgeColor','r','MarkerSize',
20,'MarkerFaceColor','w');
    set(gca,'xticklabel',[],'yticklabel',[]) 
    ylim([0 1]);
end
axes(handles.axes6);
if g_Pump == 1
    plot(.5,'o','MarkerEdgeColor','r','MarkerSize',
20,'MarkerFaceColor','g');
    set(gca,'xticklabel',[],'yticklabel',[]) 
    ylim([0 1]);
else
    plot(.5,'o','MarkerEdgeColor','r','MarkerSize',
20,'MarkerFaceColor','w');
    set(gca,'xticklabel',[],'yticklabel',[]) 
    ylim([0 1]);
end
      
set(handles.l_Difference,'String',num2str(d_Level/20))
set(handles.out_Flow,'String',num2str(out_Flow/20))
 
pause(.5);    
guidata(hObject, handles);
 
end
 
function c_Rate_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
c_Rate = get(hObject,'Value');
110
assignin('base','c_Rate',c_Rate)
set(handles.c_RateNum,'String',num2str(c_Rate))
 
function c_Rate_CreateFcn(hObject, eventdata, handles)
if isequal(get(hObject,'BackgroundColor'), get
(0,'defaultUicontrolBackgroundColor'))
    set(hObject,'BackgroundColor',[.9 .9 .9]);
end
 
function g_Mode_Callback(hObject, eventdata, handles)
g_Mode = get(hObject,'Value');
assignin('base','g_Mode',g_Mode)
set(handles.g_ModeNum,'String',num2str(g_Mode))
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